Aquatic animals, cognitive ethology, and ethics: questions about sentience and other troubling issues that lurk in turbid water

In this general, strongly pro-animal, and somewhat utopian and personal essay, I argue that we owe aquatic animals respect and moral consideration just as we owe respect and moral consideration to all other animal beings, regardless of the taxonomic group to which they belong. In many ways it is more difficult to convince some people of our ethical obligations to numerous aquatic animals because we do not identify or empathize with them as we do with animals with whom we are more familiar or to whom we are more closely related, including those species (usually terrestrial) to whom we refer as charismatic megafauna. Many of my examples come from animals that are more well studied but they can be used as models for aquatic animals. I follow Darwinian notions of evolutionary continuity to argue that if we feel pain, then so too do many other animals, including those that live in aquatic environs. Recent scientific data ('science sense') show clearly that many aquatic organisms, much to some people's surprise, likely suffer at our hands and feel their own sorts of pain. Throughout I discuss how cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines. Lastly, I argue that when we are uncertain if we are inflicting pain due to our incessant, annoying, and frequently unnecessary intrusions into the lives of other animals as we go about 'redecorating nature' (removing animals or moving them from place to place), we should err on the side of the animals and stop engaging in activities that cause pain and suffering.     

The welfare of fish

Our interactions with fish cover a wide range of activities including enjoying them as pets to consuming them as food. I propose that we confine the consideration of the welfare of fish to their physiology, and not join the discussion on whether fish can feel pain and suffering, as humans. A significant proportion of the papers on animal welfare center on whether non-human animals can feel pain, and suffer as humans. This is a question that never can be answered unequivocally. The premise of the present paper is that we have an ethical responsibility to respect the life and wellbeing of all organisms. Thus, we should concentrate on the behavioural, physiological, and cellular indicators of their well-being and attempt to minimize a state of stress in the animals that we have in our care or influence.     

Expanding the moral circle: farmed fish as objects of moral concern

Until recently fish welfare attracted little attention, but international and national legislation and standards of fish welfare are now emerging and an overview of these developments is presented in this study. Whereas animal welfare legislation is based on public morality, animal ethics does not automatically accept public morality as normative and elaborates arguments regarding the way humans should treat animals (referred to as moral standards). In this study we present the most common animal ethics theories. For most of these, sentience is considered a demarcation line for moral concern: if an animal is sentient, then it should be included in the moral circle, i.e. receive moral consideration in its own right and some basic welfare should be ensured. As for fish, research has revealed that the sensory system of teleosts can detect noxious stimuli, and that some kind of phenomenal consciousness, allowing the fish to feel pain, seems to be present. This raises the ethical question as to how much evidence we need in order to act on such indications of fish sentience. A simple risk analysis shows that the probability that fishes can feel pain is not negligible and that if they do indeed experience pain the consequences in terms of the number of suffering individuals are great. We conclude that farmed fish should be given the benefit of the doubt and we should make efforts that their welfare needs are met as well as possible. Finally, the way forward is briefly discussed: efforts must be made to understand what fish welfare means in practical fish farming. This will involve the development of research and education, greater accountability and transparency, compliance with and control of policies, and quality assurance schemes.     

道德规范与动物学

道德规范教育如今已经提升到了专业的水平。因此在专业领域里 (例如工程学和医学 ) ,道德规范教育应作为必修课程。但至今很多理科课程仍没有把它列为必修课。这就给我们提出了一个疑问 :理科是专业课程吗 ?如果是的话 ,那么科学家例如动物学家需不需要熟悉他们职责范围内的道德准则和尺度呢 ?动物学家对医学上暴露的一些问题很敏感———包括我们怎样对待动物以及我们怎样或者是否开展基因工程。但是从道德观念上来看 ,道德规范教育的实行是比这两件事更实际的。这篇论文就以上观点进行了进一步的论述 ,并且对把道德规范教育加入理科课程的需求和可能性做了评估。在现实社会里 ,动物科学家是被敬重的专业人士。他们每天面对着许多极可能影响我们生活环境的决策。有鉴于此 ,动物科学家必需掌握道德规范的标准 ,并且有能力做出与此相符合的决策。这才能使我们在动物学的教学过程中确保动物学家持续稳定的专业发展方向     

A moderate Buddhist animal research ethics

Though there is a burgeoning interest in applied Buddhist ethics, Buddhist animal research ethics remains an underdeveloped area. In this paper I will explore how some central Buddhist ethical considerations can usefully engage our use of other animals (henceforth, animals) in science. As the scientific use of animals is broad, I will narrow my focus to laboratory science. I will show that, though a Buddhist abolitionism would not be unmotivated, it is possible to reject it. While doing so, it will be important to resist emphasizing elements of Buddhist thought that merely provide reasons to adopt the dominant ethical framework governing laboratory animal research ethics, known as the 3Rs. Though I will suggest how a Buddhist animal research ethics can sometimes permit the use of animals in harmful research, it will also require ethical constraints that resonate with some of the more progressive elements in ‘Western’ bioethics.     

The Science of Animal Suffering

Can suffering in non‐human animals be studied scientifically? Apart from verbal reports of subjective feelings, which are uniquely human, I argue that it is possible to study the negative emotions we refer to as suffering by the same methods we use in ourselves. In particular, by asking animals what they find positively and negatively reinforcing (what they want and do not want), we can define positive and negative emotional states. Such emotional states may or may not be accompanied by subjective feelings but fortunately it is not necessary to solve the problem of consciousness to construct a scientific study of suffering and welfare. Improvements in animal welfare can be based on the answers to two questions: Q1: Will it improve animal health? and Q2: Will it give the animals something they want? This apparently simple formulation has the advantage of capturing what most people mean by ‘improving welfare’ and so halting a potentially dangerous split between scientific and non‐scientific definitions of welfare. It can also be used to validate other controversial approaches to welfare such as naturalness, stereotypies, physiological and biochemical measures. Health and what animals want are thus not just two of many measures of welfare. They provide the definition of welfare against which others can be validated. They also tell us what research we have to do and how we can judge whether welfare of animals has been genuinely improved. What is important, however, is for this research to be done in situ so that it is directly applicable to the real world of farming, the sea or an animal’s wild habitat. It is here that ethology can make major contributions.     

Wild justice and fair play: cooperation,forgiveness, and morality in animals

In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice’ and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal?’ we can discover rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a ‘dogocentrist’ and practice ‘dogomorphism.’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big’ questions: Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust? Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair’ mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual's reproductive fitness, are more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for individuals to be able to behave fairly, to empathize, to behave morally? Can we use information about moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? I conclude that there is strong selection for cooperative fair play in which individuals establish and maintain a social contract to play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may be also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved. I also claim that the ability to make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely to do in a given social situation is a useful litmus test for explaining what might be happening in an individual's brain during social encounters, and that intentional or representational explanations are often important for making these predictions.     

The highs and lows of theoretical interpretation in animal-metacognition research

Humans feel uncertain. They know when they do not know. These feelings and the responses to them ground the research literature on metacognition. It is a natural question whether animals share this cognitive capacity, and thus animal metacognition has become an influential research area within comparative psychology. Researchers have explored this question by testing many species using perception and memory paradigms. There is an emerging consensus that animals share functional parallels with humans' conscious metacognition. Of course, this research area poses difficult issues of scientific inference. How firmly should we hold the line in insisting that animals' performances are low-level and associative? How high should we set the bar for concluding that animals share metacognitive capacities with humans? This area offers a constructive case study for considering theoretical problems that often confront comparative psychologists. The authors present this case study and address diverse issues of scientific judgement and interpretation within comparative psychology.     

Philosophical background of attitudes toward and treatment of invertebrates

People who interact with or make decisions about invertebrate animals have an attitude toward them, although they may not have consciously worked it out. Three philosophical approaches underlie this attitude. The first is the contractarian, which basically contends that animals are only automata and that we humans need not concern ourselves with their welfare except for our own good, because cruelty and neglect demean us. A second approach is the utilitarian, which focuses on gains versus losses in interactions between animals, including humans. Given the sheer numbers of invertebrates-they constitute 99% of the animals on the planet- this attitude implicitly requires concern for them and consideration in particular of whether they can feel pain. Third is the rights-based approach, which focuses on humans-treatment of animals by calling for an assessment of their quality of life in each human-animal interaction. Here scholars debate to what extent different animals have self-awareness or even consciousness, which may dictate our treatment of them. Regardless of the philosophical approach to invertebrates, information and education about their lives are critical to an understanding of how humans ought to treat them.     

In pursuit of peak animal welfare; the need to prioritize the meaningful over the measurable

Despite the diversity of animal welfare definitions, most recognise the centrality of the feelings of animals which are currently impossible to measure directly. As a result, animal welfare assessment is heavily reliant upon the indirect measurement of factors that either affect what animals feel, or are effected by how they feel. Physiological and health orientated measures have emerged as popular metrics for assessing welfare because they are quantifiable, can effect and be affected by how animals feel and have merits regardless of their relationship to the feelings of animals. However, their popularity in animal welfare assessment has led to them having a disproportionate influence on animal management to the detriment of animal welfare in numerous instances. Here, the case is made that a tension exists between management that prioritizes aspects of care reflecting popular animal welfare metrics such as those relating to physical health, and management that emphasizes psychological wellbeing. By re‐examining the relative merits of physical and psychological priorities in animal management, an alternate animal welfare paradigm emerges less tied to traditional welfare metrics. This paradigm theorizes about the possibility for an optimal animal welfare state to exist where managed animal populations provided essential psychological outlets but protected from key physical stressors routinely experienced in the wild, might experience higher levels of welfare than wild populations would routinely experience. The proposition that optimal animal welfare could theoretically be achieved in well managed and well designed captive environments challenges a widely held ethical perspective that captivity is inherently bad for animal welfare.     

Reflecting on ethical and legal issues in wildlife disease

Disease in wildlife raises a number of issues that have not been widely considered in the bioethical literature. However, wildlife disease has major implications for human welfare. The majority of emerging human infectious diseases are zoonotic: that is, they occur in humans by cross‐species transmission from animal hosts. Managing these diseases often involves balancing concerns with human health against animal welfare and conservation concerns. Many infectious diseases of domestic animals are shared with wild animals, although it is often unclear whether the infection spills over from wild animals to domestic animals or vice versa. Culling is the standard means of managing such diseases, bringing economic considerations, animal welfare and conservation into conflict. Infectious diseases are also major threatening processes in conservation biology and their appropriate management by culling, vaccination or treatment raises substantial animal ethics issues. One particular issue of great significance in Australia is an ongoing research program to develop genetically modified pathogens to control vertebrate pests including rabbits, foxes and house mice. Release of any self‐replicating GMO vertebrate pathogen gives rise to a whole series of ethical questions. We briefly review current Australian legal responses to these problems. Finally, we present two unresolved problems of general importance that are exemplified by wildlife disease. First, to what extent can or should ‘bioethics’ be broadened beyond direct concerns with human welfare to animal welfare and environmental welfare? Second, how should the irreducible uncertainty of ecological systems be accounted for in ethical decision making?     

Animal welfare and the refinement of neuroscience research methods--a case study of Huntington's disease models

The use of animals in biomedical and other research presents an ethical dilemma: we do not want to lose scientific benefits, nor do we want to cause laboratory animals to suffer. Scientists often refer to the potential human benefits of animal models to justify their use. However, even if this is accepted, it still needs to be argued that the same benefits could not have been achieved with a mitigated impact on animal welfare. Reducing the adverse effects of scientific protocols ('refinement') is therefore crucial in animal-based research. It is especially important that researchers share knowledge on how to avoid causing unnecessary suffering. We have previously demonstrated that even in studies in which animal use leads to spontaneous death, scientists often fail to report measures to minimize animal distress (Olsson et al. 2007). In this paper, we present the full results of a case study examining reports, published in peer-reviewed journals between 2003 and 2004, of experiments employing animal models to study the neurodegenerative disorder Huntington's disease. In 51 references, experiments in which animals were expected to develop motor deficits so severe that they would have difficulty eating and drinking normally were conducted, yet only three references were made to housing adaptation to facilitate food and water intake. Experiments including end-stages of the disease were reported in 14 papers, yet of these only six referred to the euthanasia of moribund animals. If the reference in scientific publications reflects the actual application of refinement, researchers do not follow the 3Rs (replacement, reduction, refinement) principle. While in some cases, it is clear that less-than-optimal techniques were used, we recognize that scientists may apply refinement without referring to it; however, if they do not include such information in publications, it suggests they find it less relevant. Journal publishing policy could play an important role: first, in ensuring that referees seriously consider whether submitted studies were indeed carried out with the smallest achievable negative impact on the animals and, secondly, in encouraging scientists to share refinements through the inclusion of a 3Rs section in papers publishing the results of animal-based research.     

Animal dissection and evidence-based life-science and health-professions education

Cambridge mathematician and philosopher W. K. Clifford (1879/1999) con-cluded his famous essay, "The Ethics of Belief" with the bold claim that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (p.77). Clifford's enthusiasm for evidentialism-the principle that one should proportion one's belief to the strength of the evidence-may have been overzealous, but a plausible interpretation of his view is this: Because beliefs of-ten have serious moral consequences, one should base one's beliefs on the evi-dence, and it is intellectually and morally irresponsible not to do so. This per-spective motivates recent so-called "evidence-based" methods in the fields of medicine and education. Balcombe's (2000, 2001) case for replacing learning methods that require pain, suffering, and death for animals with methods that do not (computer-assisted learning, three-dimensional models, videotapes, and other alternatives) can be seen as motivated by this evidentialist perspective. Balcombe provided a wealth of empirical evidence from educational studies to show that in most contexts animal dissection is not necessary-and even counterproductive-to achieve valid educa-tional goals, especially higher order goals (concept learning and problem solving). He demonstrated that no sound defense of dissection has been given. Can we learn as effectively without hurting or killing another being? If so, why do we not try? Many of the studies Balcombe cites have supported sufficiently the adequacy and, often, superiority of learning methods that do not harm animals or students. The first of the aforementioned questions is being answered; we can learn effectively with these non-detrimental methods. Those who seek to educate (and accept the prin-ciple of "do no harm") must seize the second question because they see, in the big pic-ture, the benefit for themselves, their students, their society, and other sentient beings. (p. 132)     

Microbial rights?

Our ability to disrupt habitats and manipulate living organisms requires a discussion of the ethics of microbiology, even if we argue that microbes themselves have no rights.Synthetic biology and the increasing complexity of molecular biology have brought us to the stage at which we can synthesize new microorganisms. This has generated pressing questions about whether these new organisms have any place in our system of ethics and how we should treat them.The idea that microbes might have some moral claims on us beyond their practical uses or instrumental value is not a new question. Microbiologist Bernard Dixon (1976) presciently asked whether it was ethical to take the smallpox virus to extinction at the height of the attempts of the World Health Organization in the 1970s to eradicate it. There is no unambiguous answer. Today, we might still ask this question, but we might extend it to ask whether the destruction or extinction of a synthetic microbe that was made by humans is also ethically questionable or is such an entity—in that it is designed—more like a machine, which we have no compunction in terminating? Would two lethal pathogens, one of them synthetic and one of them natural, but otherwise identical, command the same moral claims?In a colloquial way, we might ask whether microbes have rights. In previous papers (Cockell, 2004) I have discussed the ‘rights'' of microbes and further explored some issues about the ethics we apply to them (Cockell, 2008). Julian Davies, in a recent opinion article in EMBO reports (Davies, 2010) described my assertion that they should have constitutional rights as ‘ridiculous''. Although I did suggest that environmental law could be changed to recognize the protection of microbial ecosystems—which would imply statutory rights or protection—nowhere have I claimed that microbes should have ‘constitutional'' rights. Nevertheless, this misattribution provides a useful demonstration of the confusion that exists about exactly how we should treat microbes.Few people are in any doubt that microbes should be conserved for their direct uses to humans, for example, in food and drug production, and their indirect uses such as the crucial role they have in the health of ecosystems. Indeed, these motivations can be used to prioritize microbial conservation and protection efforts (Cockell & Jones, 2009). The crucial question is whether microbes have ‘intrinsic value'' beyond their practical uses. If the answer is ‘no'', then we should have no guilt about deliberately driving microbes to extinction for our benefit. However, there are people who feel uneasy with this conclusion, a feeling that calls forth more complex ethical questions.The question is whether microbes have some sort of ‘interests'' that make demands on our treatment of them that go beyond a mere utilitarian calculation. These arguments themselves question what we define as ‘interests'' and whether interests make demands on us. A microbe has no future plans or thought processes; the sorts of interests that are accepted as being of sufficient scope to place demands on our treatment of other human beings, for instance. However, microbes do have biological interests. A halophilic microbe might eventually die if it is dropped into freshwater. Does our knowledge of what is in the biological interests of a microbe mean that we must show it any consideration beyond practical uses? The answer is not obviously negative (Taylor, 1981), but even if we decide that it is, this does not let us off the hook quite yet.There are other intrinsic value arguments that are more obscure, particularly those around the notion of ‘respect''; the idea that we should show empathy towards the trajectory, however deterministic, of other life forms. These unquantifiable and controversial arguments might, nevertheless, partly explain any unease that we have in watching a group of people smash up and destroy some exquisite microbial mats, just because they were bored.Clearly, human instrumental needs do trump microbes at some level. If they did not, we could not use bleach in our houses, an absurd end-point raised in a 1970s science fiction story that explored the futuristic ramifications of full microbial rights, in which household bleaches and deodorants are banned (Patrouch, 1977).However, we should not be so quick to ridicule ideas about microbial ethics and rights. Although it might be true that phages kill a large percentage of the bacterial population of the world every few days, as Julian Davies points out, human society has achieved an unprecedented capacity for destruction and creation. Our ability to poison and disrupt habitats has been unquantified, with respect to the loss of microbial species. Both synthetic biology and bioterrorism raise the spectre of creating new organisms, including pathogens, which we might need to control or deliberately pursue to extinction. Dixon''s dilemma about the smallpox virus, raised more than 30 years ago, has become an urgent point of discussion in the ethics of molecular biology and microbiology.     

Mapping out structural features in clinical care calling for ethical sensitivity: a theoretical approach to promote ethical competence in healthcare personnel and clinical ethical support services (CESS)

Clinical ethical support services (CESS) represent a multifaceted field of aims, consultancy models, and methodologies. Nevertheless, the overall aim of CESS can be summed up as contributing to healthcare of high ethical standards by improving ethically competent decision-making in clinical healthcare. In order to support clinical care adequately, CESS must pay systematic attention to all real-life ethical issues, including those which do not fall within the 'favourite' ethical issues of the day. In this paper we attempt to capture a comprehensive overview of categories of ethical tensions in clinical care. We present an analytical exposition of ethical structural features in judgement-based clinical care predicated on the assumption of the moral equality of human beings and the assessment of where healthcare contexts pose a challenge to achieving moral equality. The account and the emerging overview is worked out so that it can be easily contextualized with regards to national healthcare systems and specific branches of healthcare, as well as local healthcare institutions. By considering how the account and the overview can be applied to i) improve the ethical competence of healthcare personnel and consultants by broadening their sensitivity to ethical tensions, ii) identify neglected areas for ethical research, and iii) clarify the ethical responsibility of healthcare institutions' leadership, as well as specifying required institutionalized administration, we conclude that the proposed account should be considered useful for CESS.     

Conclusion: Energy ethics and ethical worlds

What happens when the effects of our ethical actions stretch beyond, often far beyond, first- and second-person phenomena? What happens when one person's richly textured ethical world is another's profound violation? Energy offers a particularly useful empirical terrain on which to think through the questions posed by ethical worlds. Ethical worlds gesture both to the supra-individual, supra-present contexts in which we all craft quotidian ethics, and to the expansive geographies and timescapes in which the effects of our ethical practices ramify. Ethical worlds, fields, or landscapes are not bordered by first- or second-person experiences, but rather they intersect and interfere with one another often at great distance, often over multiple generations, and certainly not equally. Ethical practices in more powerful fields spill out, invade, and give shape to ethical practices in other ethical fields. What does it mean to start to see and feel and analyse at these ethical crossroads? In particular, what might it mean to acknowledge that structure, power, and interest – which are too often arrayed against close ethnographic attention to individual and shared experience – are not ‘larger forces’ but other ethical worlds, equally amenable to ethnographic attention?     

Thinking about Possible People: A Comment on Tooley and Rachels

Most people believe it would be wrong to bring a child into the world if in all likelihood its life would be miserable. But if pain and suffering count against bringing someone into existence, why do pleasure and happiness not count in favour of bringing them into existence? Recently in this journal Michael Tooley has re‐affirmed his rights‐based explanation for this asymmetry. In a nutshell: to create an individual whose life is not worth living would be to wrong that individual – to create an obligation that cannot be fulfilled – but it is not possible to wrong an individual who is not brought into existence. In the same issue of this journal, in an article covering a range of arguments for and against the claim that it would be good for additional people to exist, Stuart Rachels objects to Tooley’s account on the ground that it has counterintuitive implications. His most interesting argument involves a Parfit‐style counterexample: a woman is about to take a fertility pill that will result in twins, one of whom will be healthy and the other of whom will not. Does it make a difference, morally speaking, if the woman knows which of the twins will be healthy and which will not? In this paper I argue that both Rachels’ criticism of Tooley’s rights‐based account, and Tooley’s own defence of it, are unsuccessful due to their failure to come to grips with the semantics of names for possible individuals. Both of them implicitly assume that it is possible to have a potential person in mind, in a way that misleads them about the fairness of actions that involve possible people. The significance of this extends to other areas such as abortion, population policy, and embryo experimentation, where examples involving possible people are common.