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Automata,repeated games and noise
Authors:Martin A. Nowak  Karl Sigmund  Esam El-Sedy
Affiliation:(1) Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, OX1 3PS Oxford, U.K.;(2) Institut für Mathematik, Universität Wien Strudlhofgasse 4, A-1090 Vienna, Austria;(3) Department of Mathematics, Ain Shames University, Abassia, Cairo, Egypt
Abstract:We consider two-state automata playing repeatedly the Prisoner's Dilemma (or any other 2 × 2-game). The 16 × 16-payoff matrix is computed for the limiting case of a vanishingly small noise term affecting the interaction. Some results concerning the evolution of populations of automata under the action of selection are obtained. The special role of ldquowin-stay, lose-shiftrdquo-strategies is examined.
Keywords:
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