Using Fault Tree Analysis to Assess Bioterrorist Risks to the U.S. Food Supply

Concerns about terrorist use of biological agents have increased at state and federal levels and in the popular press. Vulnerability of U.S. agricultural assets to bioterrorism has received less attention. A bioterrorist could use the U.S. food supply system to deliver a bioagent to a human target or use a bioagent to destroy it's inputs or infrastructure. Establishing effective agriculture security programs requires condensing generalizations about such bioterrorist threats into specific attack scenarios. This paper suggests a two-stage process to achieve this: problem formulation to define and rank scenarios, then quantitative risk assessment of selected, more highly ranked, scenarios. The quantitative component is illustrated for two specific scenarios: the actual 1984 Rajneeshee incident in Oregon and a hypothetical release of oral anthrax into the food supply system. The fault tree analysis of these scenarios suggests that the food supply system may be a less than optimal bioagent delivery mechanism, particularly if the objective is a mass casualty attack, as a number of events must occur simultaneously with reasonable probability if a bioagent is likely to be deployed effectively. In addition, an environmentally stable bioagent would be required if only the food system were used to deliver it to human consumers, but early detection of an intentional release common bioagent may be difficult absent specific intelligence or “unusual” epidemiological circumstances.