A developmental approach to the origins of self-recognition in great apes

In this paper I present an hypothesis to explain the presence of mirror self-recognition (MSR) in great apes and human infants, and the absence of MSR in monkeys. This hypothesis is based on the following elements: 1) review of Gallupian studies of MSR in monkeys and apes; 2) review of Lewis & Brooks-Gunn's study for self-recognition in human infants; 3) application of the human model to comparative data on MSR in nonhuman primates; 4) discussion of cognitive correlates of MSR in human infants; 5) analysis of the cognitive correlates of MSR absence in monkeys, and MSR presence in apes; 6) comparative analysis of the modalities of occurrence of imitation and understanding of causality in monkeys and apes; and 7) a cladistic reconstruction of the evolution of MSR.