Transitions between cooperative and non-cooperative responding in the 'Pigeon's Dilemma'

Two pigeons played Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) against a simulated opponent pre-programmed to play ‘Tit-For-Tat’ (TFT) and ‘Random’ (RND) strategies. Each pigeon received differential amounts of access to food following choices of either ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’ on a trial. After 1000 trials against TFT and 500 trials against RND, results indicated that choice allocation was optimal when the birds played against RND but was sub-optimal when the birds played against TFT. In order to determine why the pigeons responded suboptimally against TFT, a trial-by-trial analysis of the data was conducted. The analysis revealed that once a pigeon had received the ‘Sucker's’ payoff (S), it was more likely to defect and receive the ‘Temptation’ payoff (T) than to cooperate and receive the ‘Reward’ (R) payoff. Local reinforcement contingencies appear to determine suboptimal responding against TFT in the iterated Pigeon's Dilemma.