Beneficial laggards: multilevel selection,cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good games |
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| Authors: | Gergely Boza Szabolcs Számadó |
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| Institution: | 1.Department of Plant Taxonomy and Ecology,Institute of Biology, E?tv?s University,Budapest,Hungary;2.HAS-ELTE Research Group for Theoretical Biology and Ecology,Institute of Biology, E?tv?s University and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,Budapest,Hungary;3.Collegium Budapest,Institute for Advanced Study,Budapest,Hungary |
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| Abstract: | Background The origin and stability of cooperation is a hot topic in social and behavioural sciences. A complicated conundrum exists
as defectors have an advantage over cooperators, whenever cooperation is costly so consequently, not cooperating pays off.
In addition, the discovery that humans and some animal populations, such as lions, are polymorphic, where cooperators and
defectors stably live together -- while defectors are not being punished--, is even more puzzling. Here we offer a novel explanation
based on a Threshold Public Good Game (PGG) that includes the interaction of individual and group level selection, where individuals
can contribute to multiple collective actions, in our model group hunting and group defense. |
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