Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation |
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| Institution: | 1. Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, Sapporo 060-0810, Japan;2. The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Tokyo 102-8471, Japan;1. Department of Psychology, Department of Economics, Program in Cognitive Science, School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA;2. Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;1. Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, United States;2. Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), 1129 Blindern, 0318 Oslo, Norway;3. Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, 1097 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway;1. Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, WC1E 6BT, UK;2. Institut de Biologie, Eco-Ethologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, CH-2000, Switzerland;1. Department of Management, Kochi University of Technology, 185 Miyanokuchi, Tosayamada-Cho, Kami-Shi, Kochi, 782-8502, Japan;2. Faculty of Economics and Information, Gifu Shotoku Gakuen University, 1-38, Nakauzura, Gifu-shi, Gifu, 500-8288, Japan;3. College of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, 1-1-1 Noji-higashi, Kusatsu-shi, Shiga, 525-8577, Japan;4. School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan |
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| Abstract: | Human cooperation in a large group of genetically unrelated people is an evolutionary puzzle. Despite its costly nature, cooperative behavior is commonly found in all human societies—a fact that has interested researchers from a wide range of disciplines, including biology, economics, and psychology, to name a few. Many behavioral experiments have demonstrated that cooperation within a group can be sustained when free riders are punished. We argue that punishment has both a direct effect and an indirect effect on promoting cooperation. The direct effect of punishment alters the consequences of cooperation and defection in such a way as to make a rational person prefer cooperation. The indirect effect of punishment promotes cooperation among conditional cooperators by providing the condition necessary for their cooperation (i.e., the expectation that other members will also cooperate). Here we present data from two one-shot n-person prisoner's dilemma games, demonstrating that the indirect effect of punishment complements the direct effect to increase cooperation in the game. Furthermore, we show that direct and indirect effects are robust across two forms of punishment technology: either when punishment is voluntarily provided by game players themselves or when it is exogenously provided by the experimenter. |
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