Food sharing: a model of manipulation by harassment

Most analyses of food-sharing behavior invoke complex explanationssuch as indirect and delayed benefits for sharing via kin selectionand reciprocal altruism. However, food sharing can be a moregeneral phenomenon accounted for by more parsimonious, mutualisticexplanations. We propose a game theoretical model of a generalsharing situation in which food owners share because it isin their own self-interest—they avoid high costs associatedwith beggar harassment. When beggars harass, owners may benefitfrom sharing part of the food if their consumption rate islow relative to the rate of cost accrual. Our model predictsthat harassment can be a profitable strategy for beggars ifthey reap some direct benefits from harassing other than sharedfood (such as picking up scraps). Therefore, beggars may manipulatethe owner's fitness payoffs in such a way as to make sharingmutualistic.