Philosophy and phylogenetic inference: a comparison of likelihood and parsimony methods in the context of Karl Popper's writings on corroboration

Advocates of cladistic parsimony methods have invoked the philosophy of Karl Popper in an attempt to argue for the superiority of those methods over phylogenetic methods based on Ronald Fisher's statistical principle of likelihood. We argue that the concept of likelihood in general, and its application to problems of phylogenetic inference in particular, are highly compatible with Popper's philosophy. Examination of Popper's writings reveals that his concept of corroboration is, in fact, based on likelihood. Moreover, because probabilistic assumptions are necessary for calculating the probabilities that define Popper's corroboration, likelihood methods of phylogenetic inference--with their explicit probabilistic basis--are easily reconciled with his concept. In contrast, cladistic parsimony methods, at least as described by certain advocates of those methods, are less easily reconciled with Popper's concept of corroboration. If those methods are interpreted as lacking probabilistic assumptions, then they are incompatible with corroboration. Conversely, if parsimony methods are to be considered compatible with corroboration, then they must be interpreted as carrying implicit probabilistic assumptions. Thus, the non-probabilistic interpretation of cladistic parsimony favored by some advocates of those methods is contradicted by an attempt by the same authors to justify parsimony methods in terms of Popper's concept of corroboration. In addition to being compatible with Popperian corroboration, the likelihood approach to phylogenetic inference permits researchers to test the assumptions of their analytical methods (models) in a way that is consistent with Popper's ideas about the provisional nature of background knowledge.