Superstition and belief as inevitable by-products of an adaptive learning strategy |
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Authors: | Jan Beck Wolfgang Forstmeier |
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Institution: | (1) The Graduate School, Bangkok University, 40/4 Rama 4 Road, Klongtoey, Bangkok, 10110, Thailand |
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Abstract: | The existence of superstition and religious beliefs in most, if not all, human societies is puzzling for behavioral ecology.
These phenomena bring about various fitness costs ranging from burial objects to celibacy, and these costs are not outweighed
by any obvious benefits. In an attempt to resolve this problem, we present a verbal model describing how humans and other
organisms learn from the observation of coincidence (associative learning). As in statistical analysis, learning organisms
need rules to distinguish between real patterns and randomness. These rules, which we argue are equivalent to setting the
level of α for rejection of the null hypothesis in statistics, are governed by risk management as well as by comparison to
previous experiences. Risk management means that the cost of a possible type I error (superstition) has to be traded off against
the cost of a possible type II error (ignorance). This trade-off implies that the occurrence of superstitious beliefs is an
inevitable consequence of an organism’s ability to learn from observation of coincidence. Comparison with previous experiences
(as in Bayesian statistics) improves the chances of making the right decision. While this Bayesian approach is found in most
learning organisms, humans have evolved a unique ability to judge from experiences whether a candidate subject has the power
to mechanistically cause the observed effect. Such “strong” causal thinking evolved because it allowed humans to understand
and manipulate their environment. Strong causal thinking, however, involves the generation of hypotheses about underlying
mechanisms (i.e., beliefs). Assuming that natural selection has favored individuals that learn quicker and more successfully
than others owing to (1) active search to detect patterns and (2) the desire to explain these patterns mechanistically, we
suggest that superstition has evolved as a by-product of the first, and that belief has evolved as a by-product of the second. |
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