Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash and the secret handshake

This paper considers any evolutionary game possessing several evolutionarily stable strategies, or ESSs, with differing payoffs. A mutant is introduced which will "destroy" any ESS which yields a lower payoff than another. This mutant possesses a costless signal and also conditions on the presence of this signal in each opponent. The mutant then can protect itself against a population playing an inefficient ESS by matching this against these non-signalers. At the same time, the mutants can achieve the more efficient ESS against the signaling mutant population itself. This construction is illustrated by means of the simplest possible example, a co-ordination game. The one-shot prisoner's dilemma is used to illustrate how a superior outcome which is not induced by an ESS may be temporarily but not permanently attained. In the case of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the present argument seems to render the "evolution of co-operation" ultimately inevitable.