Active linking in evolutionary games |
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Authors: | Pacheco Jorge M Traulsen Arne Nowak Martin A |
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Affiliation: | Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. pacheco@cii.fc.ul.pt |
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Abstract: | In the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, the individuals of a population meet each other at random, and they have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions. Here we remove these simplifying assumptions. We introduce a new model, where individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. In a limiting case, the linking dynamics introduces a simple transformation of the payoff matrix. We outline conditions for evolutionary stability. As a specific example, we study the interaction between cooperators and defectors. We find a simple relationship that characterizes those linking dynamics which allow natural selection to favour cooperation over defection. |
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Keywords: | Evolutionary game theory Structured populations Coevolution Dynamically structured populations |
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