Public goods games with reward in finite populations |
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Authors: | Peter A I Forsyth Christoph Hauert |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Mathematics,University of British Columbia,Vancouver,Canada;2.Department of Economics,University of Toronto,Toronto,Canada |
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Abstract: | Public goods games paraphrase the problem of cooperation in game theoretical terms. Cooperators contribute to a public good
and thereby increase the welfare of others at a cost to themselves. Defectors consume the public good but do not pay its cost
and therefore outperform cooperators. Hence, according to genetic or cultural evolution, defectors should be favored and the
public good disappear – despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors. The maximization
of short term individual profits causes the demise of the common resource to the detriment of all. This outcome can be averted
by introducing incentives to cooperate. Negative incentives based on the punishment of defectors efficiently stabilize cooperation
once established but cannot initiate cooperation. Here we consider the complementary case of positive incentives created by
allowing individuals to reward those that contribute to the public good. The finite-population stochastic dynamics of the
public goods game with reward demonstrate that reward initiates cooperation by providing an escape hatch out of states of
mutual defection. However, in contrast to punishment, reward is unable to stabilize cooperation but, instead, gives rise to
a persistent minority of cooperators. |
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