A Theoretical Foundation for Life-Cycle Assessment

The presence of value judgments in life-cycle impact assessment (LCIA) has been a constant source of controversy. According to a common interpretation, the international standard on LCIA requires that the assessment methods used in published comparisons be "value free." Epistemologists argue that even natural science rests on "constitutive" and "contextual" value judgments. The example of the equivalency potential for climate change, the global warming potential (GWP), demonstrates that any impact assessment method inevitably contains not only constitutive and contextual values, but also preference values. Hence, neither life-cycle assessment (LCA) as a whole nor any of its steps can be "value free." As a result, we suggest a more comprehensive definition of objectivity in LCA that allows arguments about values and their relationship to facts. We distinguish three types of truth claims: factual claims, which are based on natural science; normative claims, which refer to preference values; and relational claims, which address the proper relation between factual knowledge and values. Every assessment method, even the GWP, requires each type of claim. Rational arguments can be made about each type of claim. Factual truth claims can be assessed using the scientific method. Normative claims can be based on ethical arguments. The values of individuals or groups can be elicited using various social science methods. Relational claims must follow the rules of logic. Relational claims are most important for the development of impact assessment methods. Because LCAs are conducted to satisfy the need of decision makers to consider environmental impacts, relational claims about impact assessment methods should refer to this goal. This article introduces conditions that affect environmental decision making and discusses how LCA—values and all—can be defended as a rational response to the challenge of moving uncertain scientific information into the policy arena.