Selected effects and causal role functions in the brain: the case for an etiological approach to neuroscience |
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Authors: | Justin Garson |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Hunter College of the City University of New York, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10065, USA |
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Abstract: | Despite the voluminous literature on biological functions produced over the last 40 years, few philosophers have studied the
concept of function as it is used in neuroscience. Recently, Craver (forthcoming; also see Craver 2001) defended the causal role theory against the selected effects theory as the most appropriate theory of function for neuroscience.
The following argues that though neuroscientists do study causal role functions, the scope of that theory is not as universal
as claimed. Despite the strong prima facie superiority of the causal role theory, the selected effects theory (when properly developed) can handle many cases from neuroscience
with equal facility. It argues this by presenting a new theory of function that generalizes the notion of a ‘selection process’
to include processes such as neural selection, antibody selection, and some forms of learning—that is, to include structures
that have been differentially retained as well as those that have been differentially reproduced. This view, called the generalized
selected effects theory of function, will be defended from criticism and distinguished from similar views in the literature. |
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