Facing the crowd: intruder pressure,within‐group competition,and the resolution of conflicts over group‐membership

Recent theory in social evolution has been mainly concerned with competition and cooperation within social groups of animals and their impact on the stability of those groups. Much less attention has been paid to conflicts arising as a result of solitary floaters (outsiders) attempting to join groups of established residents (insiders). We model such conflicts over group‐membership using a demographically explicit approach in which the rates of births and deaths in a population determine the availability of group‐vacancies and the number of floaters competing over these vacancies. We find that the outcome of within‐group competition, reflected in the partitioning of reproduction among group members, exerts surprisingly little influence on the resolution of insider‐outsider conflict. The outcome of such conflict is also largely unaffected by differences in resource holding potential between insiders and outsiders. By contrast, whether or not groups form is mainly determined by demographic factors (variation in vital rates such as fecundity and mortality) and the resulting population dynamics. In particular, at high floater densities territory defense becomes too costly, and groups form because insiders give in to the intruder pressure imposed on them by outsiders. We emphasize the importance of insider‐outsider conflicts in social evolution theory and highlight avenues for future research.