Homology as a relation of correspondence between parts of individuals

The recognition of correspondences has long been a fundamental activity among systematists. Advocates ofNaturphilosophie, such as Lorenz Oken, drew far-fetched analogies between taxonomic groups and all sorts of other things, including the Persons of the Trinity. They treated change through time either as analogous to an ontogeny or as the product of divinely instituted laws of nature. Darwin changed things by making the taxonomic units strictly historical, implying that they are not classes but rather individuals in a broad metaphysical sense. That means that taxa are concrete, particular things, or wholes made up of parts which are themselves individuals, and that there are no laws of nature for them. Homology is a relationship of correspondence between parts of organisms that are also parts of populations and lineages. It is not a relationship of similarity, and unlike similarity it is transitive. Analogy is a relationship of correspondence between parts of organisms that are members of classes, and is not necessarily due to function. Taxa, like other individuals, can change indefinitely, and the only thing that they must share is a common ancestor. They do not share an essence, Platonic Idea orBauplan, although “conservative characters” may be widespread in them. Iterative homology likewise is a relationship of correspondence, but the nature of that correspondence remains unclear. The difficulties of the homology concept can be overcome by treating phylogenetics and comparative biology in general as historical narrative. From the 46th “Phylogenetisches Symposium”, Jena, Germany, November 20–21, 2004. Theme of the symposium: “Evolutionary developmental biology—new challenges to the homology concept”.