Policing and punishment across the domains of social evolution

Several decades of research in humans, other vertebrates, and social insects have offered fascinating insights into the dynamics of punishment (and its subset, policing), but authors have only rarely addressed whether there are fundamental joint principles underlying the maintenance of these behaviors. Here we present a punisher/bystander approach rooted in inclusive fitness logic to predict which individuals should take on punishing roles in animal societies. We apply our scheme to societies of eusocial Hymenoptera and nonhuman vertebrate social breeders, and we outline potential extensions for understanding conflict regulation among cells in metazoan bodies and unrelated individuals in human societies. We highlight that: 1) no social unit is expected to express punishment behavior unless it collects positive inclusive fitness benefits that surpass alternative benefits of bystanding; 2) punishment with public good benefits can be maintained through either direct fitness benefits (coercion) or indirect fitness benefits (correction) or both; 3) differences across social systems in the distributions of power, relatedness, and reproductive options drive variation in the extent to which individuals actively punish; and 4) inclusive fitness logic captures many punishment‐relevant evolutionary and ecological variables in a single framework that appears to apply across very different types of social arrangements. Synthesis Researchers have long observed that individuals in animal societies punish (and by extension, police) each other, but they have rarely investigated whether general principles underlie this behavior across social arrangements. In this paper, we present a punisher/bystander approach rooted in inclusive fitness logic to predict which individuals should take on punisher roles in animal societies. We apply the approach to eusocial insects and cooperatively breeding vertebrates and outline extensions towards the control of cancer cell lineages and punishment in human groups. We highlight how variation in specific social variables may drive differences in punishing/policing across the social domains.