Natural selection and social preferences |
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Authors: | Weibull Jörgen W Salomonsson Marcus |
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Institution: | Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. jorgen.weibull@hhs.se |
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Abstract: | A large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups, where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true. The expected number of surviving offspring depends on own material payoff, but may also, due to cooperative breeding and/or reproductive competition, depend on the material payoffs to other group members. The induced population dynamic is equivalent with the replicator dynamic for a game with payoffs derived from those in the original game. We apply this selection dynamic to a number of examples, including prisoners' dilemma games with and without a punishment option, coordination games, and hawk-dove games. For each of these, we compare the outcomes with those obtained under the standard replicator dynamic. By way of a revealed-preference argument, our selection dynamic can explain certain "altruistic" and "spiteful" behaviors that are consistent with individuals having social preferences. |
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Keywords: | Natural selection Group selection Social preferences Altruism Reproductive externalities |
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