Top-down Causation Without Top-down Causes |
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Authors: | Carl F Craver William Bechtel |
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Institution: | (1) Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University, One Brookings Hall, St. Louis, 63130, MO, USA;(2) Department of Philosophy-0119, University of California, 9500 Gilman Drive, LaJolla, San Diego, CA 92093, USA |
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Abstract: | We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as
appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations,
where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to
accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the
required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel causes can be translated into mechanistically
mediated effects, the posited relationship is intelligible and should raise no special philosophical objections. When they
cannot, they are suspect. |
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Keywords: | Levels Mechanisms Top-down causation Interlevel causation Constitution Explanation Emergence Reduction |
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