Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity |
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Authors: | Arne Traulsen Noam Shoresh Martin A Nowak |
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Institution: | Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA. traulsen@evolbio.mpg.de |
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Abstract: | The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying
assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite
populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall
fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results
can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach
also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive
fitness theory. |
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Keywords: | Evolutionary game theory Stochastic effects Strong selection Group selection |
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