Continued Evolution of H5N1 Influenza Viruses in Wild Birds,Domestic Poultry,and Humans in China from 2004 to 2009 |
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Authors: | Yanbing Li Jianzhong Shi Gongxun Zhong Guohua Deng Guobin Tian Jinying Ge Xianying Zeng Jiasheng Song Dongming Zhao Liling Liu Yongping Jiang Yuntao Guan Zhigao Bu Hualan Chen |
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Affiliation: | Animal Influenza Laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture and National Key Laboratory of Veterinary Biotechnology, Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, CAAS, 427 Maduan Street, Harbin 150001, People''s Republic of China |
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Abstract: | Despite substantial efforts to control H5N1 avian influenza viruses (AIVs), the viruses have continued to evolve and cause disease outbreaks in poultry and infections in humans. In this report, we analyzed 51 representative H5N1 AIVs isolated from domestic poultry, wild birds, and humans in China during 2004 to 2009, and 21 genotypes were detected based on whole-genome sequences. Twelve genotypes of AIVs in southern China bear similar H5 hemagglutinin (HA) genes (clade 2.3). These AIVs did not display antigenic drift and could be completely protected against by the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 (GS/GD/1/96)-based oil-adjuvanted killed vaccine and recombinant Newcastle disease virus vaccine, which have been used in China. In addition, antigenically drifted H5N1 viruses, represented by A/chicken/Shanxi/2/06 (CK/SX/2/06), were detected in chickens from several provinces in northern China. The CK/SX/2/06-like viruses are reassortants with newly emerged HA, NA, and PB1 genes that could not be protected against by the GS/GD/1/96-based vaccines. These viruses also reacted poorly with antisera generated from clade 2.2 and 2.3 viruses. The majority of the viruses isolated from southern China were lethal in mice and ducks, while the CK/SX/2/06-like viruses caused mild disease in mice and could not replicate in ducks. Our results demonstrate that the H5N1 AIVs circulating in nature have complex biological characteristics and pose a continued challenge for disease control and pandemic preparedness.The highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses that emerged over a decade ago in southern China have evolved into over 10 distinct phylogenetic clades based on their hemagglutinin (HA) genes. The viruses have spread to over 63 countries and to multiple mammalian species, including humans, resulting in 498 cases of infection and 294 deaths by 6 May 2010 according to the World Health Organization (WHO) (http://www.who.int). To date, none of the different H5N1 clades has acquired the ability to consistently transmit among mammalian species. The currently circulating H5N1 viruses are unique in that they continue to circulate in avian species. All previous highly pathogenic H5 and H7 viruses have naturally “burned out” or were stamped out because of their high pathogenicity in domestic poultry. While there is growing complacency about the potential of H5N1 “bird flu” to attain consistent transmissibility in humans and develop pandemicity, it is worth remembering that we have no knowledge of the time that it took the 1918 Spanish, the 1957 Asian, the 1968 Hong Kong, and the 2009 North American pandemics to develop their pandemic potentials. We may therefore currently be witnessing in real time the evolution of an H5N1 pandemic influenza virus.H5N1 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) were first detected in sick geese in Guangdong province in 1996, and both nonpathogenic and highly pathogenic (HP) H5N1 viruses were described (18). In 1997, H5N1 reassortant viruses that derived the HA gene from A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 (GS/GD/1/96)-like viruses and the other genes from H6N1 and/or H9N2 viruses caused lethal outbreaks in poultry and humans in Hong Kong (6, 7). Since then, long-term active surveillance of influenza viruses in domestic poultry has been performed, and multiple subtypes of influenza viruses have been detected in chickens and ducks in China (16, 19, 37). H5N1 influenza viruses have been repeatedly detected in apparently healthy ducks in southern China since 1999 (4, 13) and were also detected in pigs in Fujian province in 2001 and 2003 (39).Since the beginning of 2004, there have been significant outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza virus infection involving multiple poultry farm flocks in more than 20 provinces in China (2). H5N1 viruses resulted in the deaths of millions of domestic poultry, including chickens, ducks, and geese, as the result of infection or of culling and the deaths of thousands of wild birds (5, 20). Thirty-eight human cases of HP H5N1 infection with 25 fatalities have been associated with direct exposure to infected poultry (WHO; http://www.who.int). Since 2004, the vaccination of domestic poultry has been used for the control of HP H5N1 influenza virus in China. While this strategy has been effective at reducing the incidence of HP H5N1 in poultry and at markedly reducing the number of human cases, it is impossible to vaccinate every single bird due to the enormous poultry population. Outbreaks of H5N1 influenza virus still continue to occur in poultry although at a reduced frequency.A previous study by Smith et al. reported that a “Fujian-like” H5N1 influenza virus emerged in late 2005 and predominated in poultry in southern China (26). Those authors suggested that vaccination may have facilitated the selection of the “Fujian-like” sublineage. Here, we analyzed 51 representative H5N1 viruses that were isolated from wild birds, domestic poultry, and humans from 2004 to 2009 in China and described their genetic evolution and antigenicity profiles. Our results indicate that H5N1 influenza viruses in southern China, including the “Fujian-like” viruses, are complicated reassortants, which could be well protected against by GS/GD/1/96 virus-based vaccines. We documented the emergence of the latest variant of H5N1 (A/chicken/Shanxi/2/06 [CK/SX/2/06]) that broke through existing poultry vaccines. We show that this variant is less pathogenic in mice and ducks than the earlier strains and propose that the variant was not selected by the use of vaccines. |
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