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Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
Authors:Koh Hashimoto  Kazuyuki Aihara
Institution:a Aihara Complexity Modelling Project, ERATO, JST, Tokyo 153-8505, Japan
b Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo 153-8505, Japan
Abstract:Fixation processes in evolutionary game dynamics in finite diploid populations are investigated. Traditionally, frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics is modeled as deterministic replicator dynamics. This implies that the infinite size of the population is assumed implicitly. In nature, however, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic processes in finite populations have been introduced in order to study finite size effects in evolutionary game dynamics. One of the most significant studies on evolutionary dynamics in finite populations was carried out by Nowak et al. which describes “one-third law” Nowak, et al., 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646-650]. It states that under weak selection, if the fitness of strategy α is greater than that of strategy β when α has a frequency View the MathML source, strategy α fixates in a β-population with selective advantage. In their study, it is assumed that the inheritance of strategies is asexual, i.e. the population is haploid. In this study, we apply their framework to a diploid population that plays a two-strategy game with two ESSs (a bistable game). The fixation probability of a mutant allele in this diploid population is derived. A “three-tenth law” for a completely recessive mutant allele and a “two-fifth law” for a completely dominant mutant allele are found; other cases are also discussed.
Keywords:Evolutionary dynamics  Evolutionary game theory  Finite population  Replicator dynamics  Diploid population  Fixation probability
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