Mechanisms, determination and the metaphysics of neuroscience

In this paper, I evaluate recently defended mechanistic accounts of the unity of neuroscience from a metaphysical point of view. Considering the mechanistic framework in general (Sections 2 and 3), I argue that explanations of this kind are essentially reductive (Section 4). The reductive character of mechanistic explanations provides a sufficiency criterion, according to which the mechanism underlying a certain phenomenon is sufficient for the latter. Thus, the concept of supervenience can be used in order to describe the relation between mechanisms and phenomena (Section 5). Against this background, I show that the mechanistic framework is subject to the causal exclusion problem and faces the classical metaphysical options when it comes to the relations obtaining between different levels of mechanisms (Section 6). Finally, an attempt to improve the metaphysics of mechanisms is made (Section 7) and further difficulties are pointed out (Section 8).