Mutation in evolutionary games can increase average fitness at equilibrium |
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Authors: | Willensdorfer Martin Nowak Martin A |
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Affiliation: | Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. |
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Abstract: | We study game dynamical interactions between two strategies, A and B, and analyse whether the average fitness of the population at equilibrium can be increased by adding mutation from A to B. Classifying all two by two games with payoff matrix [(a,b),(c,d)], we show that mutation from A to B enhances the average fitness of the whole population (i) if both a and d are less than (b + c)/2 and (ii) if c is less than b. Furthermore, we study conditions for maximizing the productivity of strategy A, and we analyse the effect of mutations in both directions. Depending on the biological system, a mutation in an evolutionary game can be interpreted as a genetic alteration, a cellular differentiation, a change in gene expression, an accidental or deliberate modification in cultural transmission, or a learning error. In a cultural context, our results indicate that the equilibrium payoff of the population can be increased if players sometimes choose the strategy with lower payoff. In a genetic context, we have shown that for frequency-dependent selection mutation can enhance the average fitness of the population at equilibrium. |
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Keywords: | Evolutionary game theory Replicator dynamics Frequency-dependent selection |
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