The coevolution of long‐term pair bonds and cooperation

The evolution of social traits may not only depend on but also change the social structure of the population. In particular, the evolution of pairwise cooperation, such as biparental care, depends on the pair‐matching distribution of the population, and the latter often emerges as a collective outcome of individual pair‐bonding traits, which are also under selection. Here, we develop an analytical model and individual‐based simulations to study the coevolution of long‐term pair bonds and cooperation in parental care, where partners play a Snowdrift game in each breeding season. We illustrate that long‐term pair bonds may coevolve with cooperation when bonding cost is below a threshold. As long‐term pair bonds lead to assortative interactions through pair‐matching dynamics, they may promote the prevalence of cooperation. In addition to the pay‐off matrix of a single game, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium also depends on bonding cost and accidental divorce rate, and it is determined by a form of balancing selection because the benefit from pair‐bond maintenance diminishes as the frequency of cooperators increases. Our findings highlight the importance of ecological factors affecting social bonding cost and stability in understanding the coevolution of social behaviour and social structures, which may lead to the diversity of biological social systems.