Conceptual and ethical problems in the epistemology of genetic information

My thesis will be that the identification of genetic features and their medical interpretation follow at least partially from reductionist premises: “Genes are charging the gun, life(-style) will trigger it.” This simplistic metaphor illustrates a problem of genetic diagnosis: from the viewpoint of philosophy of science, concepts of the gene and the genome are vague and confused. Until now these concepts have not been defined satisfactorily. Partly on account of this there is an additional problem in applying genetic tests in medical diagnostics. The epistemic status of predictive genetic diagnosis in many cases can justifiably be called “opaque.” But a predictive genetic test is designed to reveal genetic knowledge of and for a client on the basis of scientific research. Methodologically the diagnosis of the scientific problem in genetics as a science is developed philosophically as an epistemological argument. The problem of genetics as applied science in medicine and society is the danger of irrationality due to reductionist premises of science. This problem is to be revealed by philosophical analysis. The major result of the argument is that the assessment of applications of basic research in genetics should include considerations from epistemology and philosophy of science. The epistemological status of scientific concepts and reasonableness of advice are interrelated. My thesis is that at the interface between theory of science in genetics and reasonableness of “genetic advice” is the responsibility of the researchers for concepts of their science.