Genes,agents and the institution of responsible action

The concern of this paper is with how the accounts of human beings and their behaviour now emerging from genetics, genomics and the new human biotechnology should be related to traditional accounts in which we identify ourselves as responsible agents, capable of choice, who normally act freely and voluntarily. The paper addresses these apparently competing accounts in terms of their functions and modes of use, and thereby arrives at a general solution to this current version of the ancient problem of free will and determinism. The causal scientific discourse of genetics and the everyday discourse of responsibility and choice do different things for us, it suggests, and should not be regarded as articulating conflicting theories. Whilst the former is oriented to the task of naturalistic explanation, the latter is predominantly, if not entirely, a medium of communication through which we affect each other and thereby mutually regulate our conduct. If this is indeed the case, then interesting implications follow concerning the proper relationship of the two kinds of account, which need no longer be regarded as incompatible with each other. And insights emerge into both the limitations and the profound importance of the contribution that genetics and genomics seem destined to make to the understanding of human behaviour.