Regional implementation of alternative entry control policies and their role in fisheries management

Abstract

This paper reviews and examines the development of the concept of entry control policies in fisheries management. With renewed expectations for U. S. fisheries surrounding the recent enactment of legislation that extends jurisdiction over living resources within 200 mi, optimal management of an open‐access resource becomes an increasingly important public policy problem. The paper reviews alternative entry control schemes and criteria in order to evaluate their effectiveness and suggests ways in which limited entry could be implemented incrementally. It is argued that the appropriate combination of alternative limited‐entry mechanisms should take into account regional variables that affect the feasibility of entry controls for each particular fishery. It is also postulated that exploitation of an open‐access resource such as a fishery implies certain types of political behavior and outcomes that are analogous to economic behavior and outcomes in a common‐property resource environment. These characteristics of an openaccess resource, along with physical characteristics, tend to inhibit severely the rate of development of clearly defined property rights that would enhance the overall efficiency of the resource industry. The rate of development of property rights in an open‐access resource is a function of the cost of defining and enforcing these rights. The paper urges further identification and analysis of these “transactions costs,” which are largely a function of the political environment.