Reliability and the value of information

When animals lack the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect information, they must choose to either respond to or ignore an information source. I define the reliability of information as the probability that information is correct and introduce reliability into the value of information to explore the level of risk information consumers should incur when using information. I find that when information consumers do not control the reliability of information, they should be more discriminating as the benefit of correct information declines, as the cost of misinformation increases and when acquisition costs are greater. However, when consumers pay for reliability, I find that consumers should be more discriminating as the benefit of correct information increases, the cost of misinformation increases, and when acquisition is cheaper. Application of this theory suggests that: (1) selection for individual recognition should be stronger when the cost of misinformation (deception) is high; (2) mimics can outnumber models when models are very noxious or alternative prey are abundant; and (3) memory about predators should be longer than memory about prey.