Cognitive and Motivational Requirements for the Emergence of Cooperation in a Rat Social Game

Background

Game theory and the Prisoner''s Dilemma (PD) game in particular, which captures the paradox of cooperative interactions that lead to benefits but entail costs to the interacting individuals, have constituted a powerful tool in the study of the mechanisms of reciprocity. However, in non-human animals most tests of reciprocity in PD games have resulted in sustained defection strategies. As a consequence, it has been suggested that under such stringent conditions as the PD game humans alone have evolved the necessary cognitive abilities to engage in reciprocity, namely, numerical discrimination, memory and control of temporal discounting.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We use an iterated PD game to test rats (Rattus norvegicus) for the presence of such cognitive abilities by manipulating the strategy of the opponent, Tit-for-Tat and Pseudo-Random, or the relative size of the temptation to defect. We found that rats shape their behaviour according to the opponent''s strategy and the relative outcome resulting from cooperative or defective moves. Finally, we show that the behaviour of rats is contingent upon their motivational state (hungry versus sated).

Conclusions/Significance

Here we show that rats understand the payoff matrix of the PD game and the strategy of the opponent. Importantly, our findings reveal that rats possess the necessary cognitive capacities for reciprocity-based cooperation to emerge in the context of a prisoner''s dilemma. Finally, the validation of the rat as a model to study reciprocity-based cooperation during the PD game opens new avenues of research in experimental neuroscience.