Fixation probability for a beneficial allele and a mutant strategy in a linear game under weak selection in a finite island model |
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Authors: | Ladret Véronique Lessard Sabin |
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Affiliation: | Département de mathématiques et de statistique, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128 Succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 3J7. |
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Abstract: | The effect of population structure on the probability of fixation of a newly introduced mutant under weak selection is studied using a coalescent approach. Wright's island model in a framework of a finite number of demes is assumed and two selection regimes are considered: a beneficial allele model and a linear game among offspring. A first-order approximation of the fixation probability for a single mutant with respect to the intensity of selection is deduced. The approximation requires the calculation of expected coalescence times, under neutrality, for lineages starting from two or three sampled individuals. The results are obtained in a general setting without assumptions on the number of demes, the deme size or the migration rate, which allows for simultaneous coalescence or migration events in the genealogy of the sampled individuals. Comparisons are made with limit cases as the deme size or the number of demes goes to infinity or the migration rate goes to zero for which a diffusion approximation approach is possible. Conditions for selection to favor a mutant strategy replacing a resident strategy in the context of a linear game in a finite island population are addressed. |
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Keywords: | Finite island model Beneficial allele Fixation probability Coalescence times Evolutionary game theory One-third law |
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