Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception |
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Authors: | Stephen J Boulter |
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Institution: | (1) Field Chair for Philosophy, Westminster Institute of Education, Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford, OA2 9AT, UK |
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Abstract: | In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These two conclusions taken together form the basis of Aristotelian metaphysical realism and a refutation of the neo-Kantian two-factor approach to perception. |
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Keywords: | Anti-realism Aristotle Constructivism Darwin Evolutionary biology Kant Metaphysical realism Visual perception in vertebrates |
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