A game analysis of reciprocal cooperation: Sequential food-sharing and sex role alternation

The evolution of reciprocal cooperation between non-relatives is studied. Food-sharing of vampire bats studied by Wilkinson (1984) and egg-trading of simultaneous hermaphroditic fish studied by Fisher (1980) are respectively considered as Thompson's reciprocal assistance and the iterated Hero game. Those models predicted the following: (1) Reciprocal assistance between adult bats is evolutionarily stable if they repeatedly interact for a long time. However, (2) the cost for an adult to assist a juvenile is too high to be compensated by the benefit from the juvenile. (3) A particular signal, which determines the sex role of each partner, is always displayed by a “heroic” partner which releases eggs with a larger cost. (4) If alternation of sex roles is established, then the evolutionarily stable frequency of displaying a signal of egg-release increases as the frequency of divorce decreases, and (5) a “cheating” strategy, which releases sperm on every spawning bout, is less advantageous than reciprocal cooperation.