Evolutionarily stable stealing: game theory applied to kleptoparasitism |
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Authors: | Broom, Mark Ruxton, Graeme D. |
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Affiliation: | aCentre for Statistics and Stochastic Modelling, School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Sussex Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK bDivision of Environmental and Evolutionary Biology, Graham Kerr Building, University of Glasgow Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK |
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Abstract: | We present an individual-based model of a group of foraginganimals. Individuals can obtain food either by discovering itthemselves or by stealing it from others (kleptoparasitism).Given that challenging another individual for a discovered fooditem costs time (which could otherwise be spent searching foran undiscovered item), attempting to steal from another maynot always be efficient We show that there is generally a uniquestrategy that maximizes uptake ratealways or never challengingothers. For any combination of parameter values, we can identifywhich strategy is appropraite. As a corollary to this, we predictthat small changes in ecolgical conditions can, under some circumstances,cause a dramatic change in the aggressive behavior of individuals.Further, we investigate situations where searching for undiscoveredfood and searching for potential opportunities for stealingare mutually exclusive activities (i.e., success at one canonly be improved at the expense of the other). Using game theory,we are able to find the evolutionarily stable strategy for investmentin these two activities in terms of the ecological parametersof the model. |
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Keywords: | evolutionarily stable strategy food contests foraging behavior functional response interference game theory. |
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