| Abstract: | The relevance of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis to the foundations of taxonomy (the construction of groups, both taxa and phyla) is reexamined. The nondimensional biological species concept, and not the multidimensional, taxonomic, species notion which is based on it, represents a culmination of an evolutionary understanding. It demonstrates how established evolutionary mechanisms acting on populations of sexually reproducing organisms provide the testable ontological basis of the species category. We question the ontology and epistemology of the phylogenetic or evolutionary species concept, and find it to be a fundamentally untenable one. We argue that at best, the phylogenetic species is a taxonomic species notion which is not a theoretical concept, and therefore should not serve as foundation for taxonomic theory in general, phylogenetics, and macroevolutionary reconstruction in particular. Although both evolutionary systematists and cladists are phylogeneticists, the reconstruction of the history of life is fundamentally different in these two approaches. We maintain that all method, including taxonomic ones, must fall out of well corroborated theory. In the case of taxonomic methodology the theoretical base must be evolutionary. The axiomatic assumptions that all phena, living and fossil, must be holophyletic taxa (species, and above), resulting from splitting events, and subsequently that evaluation of evolutionary change must be based on a taxic perspective codified by the Hennig ian taxonomic species notion, are not testable premises. We discuss the relationship between some biologically, and therefore taxonomically, significant patterns in nature, and the process dependence of these patterns. Process-free establishment of deductively tested “genealogies” is a contradiction in terms; it is impossible to “recover” phylogenetic patterns without the investment of causal and processual explanations of characters to establish well tested taxonomic properties of these (such as homologies, apomorphies, synapomorphies, or transformation series). Phylogenies of either characters or of taxa are historical-narrative explanations (H-N Es), based on both inductively formulated hypotheses and tested against objective, empirical evidence. We further discuss why construction of a “genealogy”, the alleged framework for “evolutionary reconstruction”, based on a taxic, cladistic outgroup comparison and a posteriori weighting of characters is circular. We define how the procedure called null-group comparison leads to the noncircular testing of the taxonomic properties of characters against which the group phylogenies must be tested. This is the only valid rooting procedure for either character or taxon evolution. While the Hennig -principle is obviously a sound deduction from the theory of descent, cladistic reconstruction of evolutionary history itself lacks a valid methodology for testing transformation hypotheses of both characters and species. We discuss why the paleontological method is part of comparative biology with a critical time dimension ana why we believe that an “ontogenetic method” is not valid. In our view, a merger of exclusive (causal and interactive, but best described as levels of organization) and inclusive (classificatory) hierarchies has not been accomplished by a taxic scheme of evolution advocated by some. Transformational change by its very nature is not classifiable in an inclusive hierarchy, and therefore no classification can fully reflect the causal and interactive chains of events constituting phylogeny, without ignoring and contradicting large areas of corroborated evolutionary theory. Attempts to equate progressive evolutionary change with taxic schemes by Haeckel were fundamentally flawed. His ideas found 19th century expression in a taxic perception of the evolutionary process (“phylogenesis”), a merger of typology, hierarchic and taxic notions of progress, all rooted in an ontogenetic view of phylogeny. The modern schemes of genealogical hierarchies, based on punctuation and a notion of “species” individuality, have yet to demonstrate that they hold promise beyond the Haeckel ian view of progressive evolution. |
