eScience and the need for data standards in the life sciences: in pursuit of objectivity rather than truth

Referring to European history of natural sciences as an example, I discuss the relation between development of standards and the emergence of new epistemic virtues. I distinguish standards relating to scientific argumentation from standards relating to data production. The former are based on truth-seeking epistemic virtues and use criteria of logical coherence and empirical grounding. They are important for the justification of an explanatory hypothesis. Data and metadata standards, on the other hand, concern the data record itself and all steps and actions taken during data production and are based on virtues of objectivity. In the second part I focus on data and metadata standards and argue that, in order to meet the requirements of eScience, the specification of the currently popular minimum information checklists should be complemented to cover four aspects: (i) content standards, which increase reproducibility and operational transparency of data production, (ii) concept standards, which increase the semantic transparency of the terms used in data records, (iii) nomenclatural standards, which provide stable and unambiguous links between the terms used and their underlying definitions or their real referents, and (iv) format standards, which increase compatibility and computer-parsability of data records. I discuss the role of scientific terminology for standardizing data and the need for using semantically standardized and formalized data-reporting languages in the form of controlled vocabularies and ontologies for establishing content standards for data in the life sciences. Finally I comment on the necessity of community participation in the development and application of standards and in making data openly available.     

Are life cycle assessments a threat to sound public policy making?

This paper deals with the question of whether Life Cycle Assessments (LCAs), with their focus on objective and quantitative results, are the best way to support public policy processes. The public policy making process is characterized as a continuous discoursive struggle. Criteria are defined to distinguish between good and bad public policy discourses to judge the effects of LCA on the public policy process. Many policy scientists argue that methodologies that emphasize quantification and the use of formal methods are not beneficial for sound public policy making. An empirical report of the role LCAs played in public policy making processes on PVC and chlorine in the Netherlands is made to evaluate the contribution of LCAs to public policy making processes and to identify the main limitations of the current LCA methodologies and practices. It appears that political actors tend to use LCAs in a polarizing way. LCAs are easily misused due to their apparent objectivity, and the quantitative and black box nature of their results. LCAs contain an implicit, normative frame that does not match the environmentalists’ perception on the kind of evidence needed on toxic effects of organochlorines, which reduced the open nature of the Dutch PVC debate. It is recommended to develop a methodology for product evaluation that approaches the issue in a more open and emergent way to prevent “premature closure” of the analysis. It is expected that a focus on the development of balanced, rich arguments on facts and values in the study process will be more fruitful than the calculation of integral, quantitative indicators.     

Industrial Ecology as a Cultural Phenomenon: On Objectivity as a Normative Position

Taking a recent column by Braden Allenby in this journal as a starting point, we argue the need for researchers in the field of industrial ecology to reflect upon its normative aspects. We argue that the field will advance through an explicit discourse on such issues as epistemological positions, the inherent normative nature of using metaphors, and the way in which the field of study relates to the field of practice.
In "Culture and Industrial Ecology," Allenby raises, and begins to address, some critical questions that define the field of industrial ecology. We suggest that his arguments dismiss too lightly issues that are central to this developing field. The purpose of this reply is to open up for further discussion what industrial ecology is, and what it is not.
We begin by summarizing Allenby's line of reasoning. We explore his arguments around the notion of objectivity and the questions he raises about the relationship among objective science, normative positions, opinions, and fads. While Allenby makes a strong plea for industrial ecology to maintain objectivity and avoid normative positions, we contend that any positions on what should or should not be included in a field of study carry normative intent. Although science might seek to be objective in its method, scientists are rarely free of such normative positions. These positions need to be explicit and open to debate. Also, Allenby's position implies that industrial ecology as a field of study should be separated from industrial ecology as a field of practice. We argue that the interrelation of these fields provides important advantages.
Our main concern is that Allenby's position forestalls discussion on important issues at the heart of the field of study. We examine some key issues around the concept of objectivity and propose an agenda for research on the cultural and ideological aspects of industrial ecology.     

My Father’s Daughter: Becoming a ‘Real’ Anthropologist among the Ubang of Southeast Nigeria

This article explores some of the complexities of fieldwork for ethnographers conducting research in the ethnographic settings of significant ‘others’. The fieldwork in question took place in the rural, geographically isolated community of Ubang, in Obudu, Nigeria, where I was following in the footsteps of my anthropologist father. Drawing on personal experience, I attempt to candidly examine the challenges inevitably faced in this situation, including acceptance by the community as a bona fide researcher, pressure to fulfill the expectations of others familiar with my father’s work, and the struggle to carve out a professional identity distinct from my father’s. An earlier version of this paper, bearing the same title, first appeared in the Anthropology Matters Journal, 2007, vol 9(1). The paper is dedicated to the memory of my father, HRH Eze (Prof.) V.C. Uchendu, whose untimely death occurred after the final editing of the article, on December 7, 2006.     

Goethe's Morphology: Urphänomene and Aesthetic Appraisal

This paper examines the relationships betweenGoethe's morphology and his ideas on aestheticappraisal. Goethe's science of morphology was toprovide the method for making evident purephenomena [Urphänomene], for makingintuitable the necessary laws behind theperceptible forms and formation of livingnature, through a disciplined perception. Thisemphasis contrasted with contemporary studiesof generation, which focused upon hiddenformative processes. It was his views onaesthetic appraisal that informed theseepistemological precepts of his science. Hisstudy of antique artefacts convinced Goethethat these should be prototypes for all art,since they made perceptible the ideal of art,its archetypes or objective forms. His ambitionwas to eliminate the subjective elements hecontended were leading contemporary art astray.He argued that the techniques he developed forcultivating the perception of the idealexemplars of art could become a model forscience, enabling the intuition of theobjective forms of nature through a similardisciplined and cultivated perception. Thispaper also examines some of the widermotivations for the particular emphases Goethegave to his science and aesthetics, noting asimilar impulse to discipline unruly forces inhis life – in his work as an administrator forthe Weimar court and Jena University, in hisvision of an ideal German culture centred onthe aristocracy, and in his literaryproductions and biographical writings. Finallyit discusses the extent to which those unrulyelements nevertheless remained a potent anddisturbing presence in his understanding ofnature, his art and his life.     

WHY MORAL PHILOSOPHERS ARE NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE MORAL EXPERTS

Professional philosophers are members of bioethical committees and regulatory bodies in areas of interest to bioethicists. This suggests they possess moral expertise even if they do not exercise it directly and without constraint. Moral expertise is defined, and four arguments given in support of scepticism about their possession of such expertise are considered and rejected: the existence of extreme disagreement between moral philosophers about moral matters; the lack of a means clearly to identify moral experts; that expertise cannot be claimed in that which lacks objectivity; and that ordinary people do not follow the advice of moral experts. I offer a better reason for scepticism grounded in the relation between moral philosophy and common‐sense morality: namely that modern moral philosophy views even a developed moral theory as ultimately anchored in common‐sense morality, that set of basic moral precepts which ordinary individuals have command of and use to regulate their own lives. Even if moral philosophers do nevertheless have a limited moral expertise, in that they alone can fully develop a set of moral judgments, I sketch reasons – grounded in the values of autonomy and of democracy – why moral philosophers should not wish non‐philosophers to defer to their putative expertise.     

Objectivity and Illusion in Evolutionary Ethics: Comments on Waller

In this paper I argue that any adequate evolutionary ethical theory needs to account for moral belief as well as for dispositions to behave altruistically. It also needs to be clear whether it is offering us an account of the motivating reasons behind human behaviour or whether it is giving justifying reasons for a particular set of behaviours or, if both, to distinguish them clearly. I also argue that, unless there are some objective moral truths, the evolutionary ethicist cannot offer justifying reasons for a set of behaviours. I use these points to refute Waller's claims that the illusion of objectivity plays a dispensable role in Ruse's theory, that my critique of Ruse's Darwinian metaethics is built on a false dilemma, that there is nothing to be distressed about if morality is not objective, and that ethical beliefs are subject to a kind of causal explanation that undermines their objectivity in a way that scientific beliefs are not.