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Harbouring a plasmid often imposes a fitness cost on the bacterial host. Motivated by implications for public health, the majority of studies on plasmid cost are focused on elements that impart antibiotic resistance. Plasmids, however, can provide a wide range of ecologically important phenotypes to their bacterial hosts-such as virulence, specialized catabolism and metal resistance. The Agrobacterium tumefaciens tumour-inducing (Ti) plasmid confers both the ability to infect dicotyledonous plants and to catabolize the metabolites that plants produce as a result of being infected. We demonstrate that this virulence and catabolic plasmid imposes a measurable fitness cost on host cells under resource-limiting, but not resource replete, environmental conditions. Additionally, we show that the expression of Ti-plasmid-borne pathogenesis genes necessary to initiate cooperative pathogenesis is extremely costly to the host cell. The benefits of agrobacterial pathogenesis stem from the catabolism of public goods produced by infected host plants. Thus, the virulence-plasmid-dependent costs we demonstrate constitute costs of cooperation typically associated with the ability to garner the benefits of cooperation. Interestingly, genotypes that harbour derived opine catabolic plasmids minimize this trade-off, and are thus able to freeload upon the pathogenesis initiated by other individuals.  相似文献   
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Mutualisms are widespread, yet their evolution has received less theoretical attention than within‐species social behaviors. Here, we extend previous models of unconditional pairwise interspecies social behavior, to consider selection for donation but also for donation‐suppressing modifiers. We present conditions under which modifiers that suppress costly donation receive either positive or negative selection; assortment only at the donation locus always leads to selection for donation suppression, as in within‐species greenbeard traits. However, genomewide assortment with modifier loci can lead to intermediate levels of donation, and these can differ in the two species even when payoffs from donation are additive and symmetric. When costly donation between species can evolve without being suppressed, we argue that it is most appropriately explained by indirect fitness benefits within the donating species, using partner species as vectors for altruism. Our work has implications for identifying both the stability and the ultimate beneficiaries of social behavior between species.  相似文献   
3.
Cooperative benefits depend on a variety of ecological factors. Many cooperative bacteria increase the population size of their groups by making a public good available. Increased local population size can alleviate the constraints of kin competition on the evolution of cooperation by enhancing the between-group fitness of cooperators. The cooperative pathogenesis of Agrobacterium tumefaciens causes infected plants to exude opines--resources that provide a nearly exclusive source of nutrient for the pathogen. We experimentally demonstrate that opines provide cooperative A. tumefaciens cells a within-group fitness advantage over saprophytic agrobacteria. Our results are congruent with a resource-consumer competition model, which predicts that cooperative, virulent agrobacteria are at a competitive disadvantage when opines are unavailable, but have an advantage when opines are available at sufficient levels. This model also predicts that freeloading agrobacteria that catabolize opines but cannot infect plants competitively displace the cooperative pathogen from all environments. However, we show that these cooperative public goods also promote increased local population size. A model built from the Price Equation shows that this effect on group size can contribute to the persistence of cooperative pathogenesis despite inherent kin competition for the benefits of pathogenesis.  相似文献   
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