Female eviction, abortion, and infanticide in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo): implications for social control of reproduction and synchronized parturition

Most cooperatively breeding species exhibit high reproductiveskew, where reproduction within the social group is monopolizedby a dominant pair. In many of these species, social controlof reproduction is the mechanism driving reproductive skew:individuals within the social group actively reduce the reproductivesuccess of others. In species where females do not suppressconception in other females, alternative routes to skewing thesocial group's reproductive output include inducing abortionin rivals, evicting them, or killing their young. This studyexamines instances of female eviction, abortion, and infanticidein a cooperatively breeding species with low preparturitionreproductive skew, the banded mongoose (Mungos mungo). Althoughinstances of these behaviors are rare in this species, aspectsof their occurrence have implications for social control ofreproduction. Abortion can be induced by the stress of beingevicted. The readmittance of females that abort suggests thatreducing communal litter size is a possible selective pressurefor eviction. This is supported by the occurrence of evictionevents in groups with relatively high numbers of reproductivefemales and by the eviction of young reproductive females. Thetiming of abortion events suggests that synchronization of parturitionwith other females in the group is a major selective pressure.Infanticide could represent the selective pressure for synchronizedparturition. Alternatively, synchronization may minimize competitiveasymmetry between pups born to different females. This paperalso describes incidences where a female aborts or gives birthto her litter over different days in order to synchronize parturition:behavior previously unrecorded in mammals.     

Shared parental care is costly for nestlings of common cuckoos and their great reed warbler hosts

Obligate avian brood parasitism typically involves one of 2strategies: parasite chicks are either 1) virulent and evictall other eggs and nest mates to be raised alone or 2) moretolerant and share foster parental care with host chicks forsome or the entirety of the nestling period. We studied theconsequences of experimentally forced mixed broods of age-matchedone common cuckoo (Cuculus canorus) and 2 great reed warbler(Acrocephalus arundinaceus) chicks. In these broods, both cuckooand host chicks grew slower than did either individual cuckoosor great reed warblers in broods of 1 parasite or 3 host chicks,respectively. Video records showed that in mixed broods, cuckoochicks received feedings less frequently than the 33% predictedby chance at 4 days of age but parental food allocations increasedto chance levels at 8 days of age. The consistent patterns oflower growth rates arose even though chicks in broods of 1 parasiteand 2 hosts received the largest prey items per feeding. Inaddition, several other measures of parental provisioning alsodid not predict species and brood-specific differences in nestlinggrowth rates across the different treatments. However, variationin begging displays and its specific costs on host and parasitechicks in the different nest treatments were not quantifiedin this study. We conclude that young of nest mate–evictorcommon cuckoos benefit from the sole occupancy of host nestsin part owing to an initial competitive disadvantage for parentalcare in broods with age-matched great reed warbler chicks.     

Reproductive competition triggers mass eviction in cooperative banded mongooses

In many vertebrate societies, forced eviction of group members is an important determinant of population structure, but little is known about what triggers eviction. Three main explanations are: (i) the reproductive competition hypothesis, (ii) the coercion of cooperation hypothesis, and (iii) the adaptive forced dispersal hypothesis. The last hypothesis proposes that dominant individuals use eviction as an adaptive strategy to propagate copies of their alleles through a highly structured population. We tested these hypotheses as explanations for eviction in cooperatively breeding banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), using a 16-year dataset on life history, behaviour and relatedness. In this species, groups of females, or mixed-sex groups, are periodically evicted en masse. Our evidence suggests that reproductive competition is the main ultimate trigger for eviction for both sexes. We find little evidence that mass eviction is used to coerce helping, or as a mechanism to force dispersal of relatives into the population. Eviction of females changes the landscape of reproductive competition for remaining males, which may explain why males are evicted alongside females. Our results show that the consequences of resolving within-group conflict resonate through groups and populations to affect population structure, with important implications for social evolution.     

Group-size-dependent punishment of idle subordinates in a cooperative breeder where helpers pay to stay

In cooperative breeding systems, dominant breeders sometimes tolerate unrelated individuals even if they inflict costs on the dominants. According to the ‘pay-to-stay’ hypothesis, (i) subordinates can outweigh these costs by providing help and (ii) dominants should be able to enforce help by punishing subordinates that provide insufficient help. This requires that dominants can monitor helping and can recognize group members individually. In a field experiment, we tested whether cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher subordinates increase their help after a forced ‘idle’ period, how other group members respond to a previously idle helper, and how helper behaviour and group responses depend on group size. Previously, idle helpers increased their submissiveness and received more aggression than control helpers, suggesting that punishment occurred to enforce help. Subordinates in small groups increased their help more than those in large groups, despite receiving less aggression. When subordinates were temporarily removed, dominants in small groups were more likely to evict returning subordinates. Our results suggest that only in small groups do helpers face a latent threat of punishment by breeders as predicted by the pay-to-stay hypothesis. In large groups, cognitive constraints may prevent breeders from tracking the behaviour of a large number of helpers.     

Reproductive control via eviction (but not the threat of eviction) in banded mongooses

Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate reproduction (the ‘restraint’ model), but this idea remains untested. Here, we use long-term behavioural and genetic data to test the assumptions of the restraint model in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), a species in which subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common. We found that dominant females suffer reproductive costs when subordinates breed, and respond to these costs by evicting breeding subordinates from the group en masse, in agreement with the assumptions of the model. We found no evidence, however, that subordinate females exercise reproductive restraint to avoid being evicted in the first place. This means that the pattern of reproduction is not the result of a reproductive ‘transaction’ to avert the threat of eviction. We present a simple game theoretical analysis that suggests that eviction threats may often be ineffective to induce pre-emptive restraint among multiple subordinates and predicts that threats of eviction (or departure) will be much more effective in dyadic relationships and linear hierarchies. Transactional models may be more applicable to these systems. Greater focus on testing the assumptions rather than predictions of skew models can lead to a better understanding of how animals control each other''s reproduction, and the extent to which behaviour is shaped by overt acts versus hidden threats.     

Women's Income and the Livelihood Strategies of Dispossessed Pastoralists Near the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania

There are numerous incidences of impoverishment and livelihood change in pastoral societies following transformations in land use, and land and livestock ownership. Opinion is divided over the effect of these changes on women. This paper considers the case of the former residents of the Mkomazi Game Reserve. Pastoralists were evicted from the Reserve in the late 1980s and their livelihoods have changed as a result. I show that women from poorer households now have to sell milk, firewood, or medicine frequently to meet daily family needs, but I argue that increased income-earning activity by women is not only the result of impoverishment. Selling goods is useful for women as it provides an income that they control and some choose to earn their own money. The income resulting is also subject to intrahousehold power dynamics. Women may have to sell more goods more often and may be less free to use the money as they wish because men sometimes withdraw normal provisions for day-to-day needs in the expectation that women's income will meet the deficit. Debates over the changing status of women in pastoral society need to be cognizant of these intrahousehold contests.     

Active DNA damage eviction by HLTF stimulates nucleotide excision repair

1. Download : Download high-res image (178KB)
2. Download : Download full-size image