The biological roots of morality

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequece of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection.Since Darwin's time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate.This article is based on a paper presented at the International Symposium onBiological Models of Human Action, Palma de Mallorca, Spain, 16–18 December 1985.     

Evolutionary theory and the foundation of moral principles

Evolutionary biology is supposed to be relevant to ethics by a number of authors. Some of them believe that it may provide and justify basic moral values. Others argue that evolutionary biology is relevant only in a negative way. They assume that it reveals the illusory nature of any attempt to justify basic moral values. In this paper one example of either approach is criticized. An analysis of examples can hardly offer sufficient grounds for a general conclusion. Nevertheless I believe that evolutionary theory is of little help when we deal with the most basic ethical questions. Three themes which are often though to provide a link between evolutionary biology and (meta)ethics — altruism, sociality and human nature — do not in fact establish that link.     

Evolutionary ethics,Darwinian ethics and ethical naturalism

The relevance of evolutionary theory to ethics goes back to Darwin but until recently discussion employed evolutionary theory to justify ethical, social and political positions. Recently, evolutionary theory has been used to explain the existence of moral systems and moral propensities and, thereby, to provide a naturalistic basis for ethics. I argue that this approach has advanced our understanding of the basis of moral systems and moral propensities but does not as yet adequately incorporate the role of cognition in its account. Cognition has the effect of decoupling to some extent — though, of course, far from fully — human moral systems from their evolutionary origins. In an adequate account, evolutionary theory will play a crucial role but so also will our evolved cognitive abilities.     

Moral commitment without objectivity or illusion: Comments on Ruse and Woolcock

Peter Woolcock, in Ruse's Darwinian Meta-Ethics: A Critique, argues that the subjectivist (nonobjectivist) Darwinian metaethics proposed by Michael Ruse (in Taking Darwin Seriously) cannot work, because the illusion of objectivity that Ruse claims is essential to morality breaks down when it is recognized as illusion, and there then remain no good reasons for acknowledging or following moral obligations. Woolcock, however, is mistaken in supposing that moral behaviour requires rational motivation. Ruse's Darwinian metaethical analysis shows why such objective support for morality is neither plausible nor necessary; and when that is recognized, it can also be seen that Ruse's proposed illusion of moral objectivity is superfluous.     

Ruse's Darwinian meta-ethics: A critique

Michael Ruse, in Taking Darwin Seriously seeks to establish that taking Darwin seriously requires us to treat morality as subjective and naturalistic. I argue that, if morality is not objective, then we have no good reason for being moral if we can avoid detection and punishment. As a consequence, we will only continue to behave morally as long as we remain ignorant of Ruse's theory, that is, as long as the cat is not let out of the bag. Ruse offers a number of arguments to show that his theory can overcome such problems. I argue that they all fail. Ruse also argues that he can offer a naturalistic account of ethics which steps around the naturalistic fallacy and avoids the confusion of reasons with causes. His principal argument for this view is an analogy between spiritualism and morality. I argue that this analogy fails.     

Ethical obligation and legal requirements: On informed consent practices in Bangladesh

Informed consent to medical intervention is fundamental in both ethics and law. But in practice it is often not taken seriously in developing countries. This paper provides an appraisal of informed consent practices in Bangladesh. Following a review of the ethical and legal principles of informed consent, it assesses the degree to which doctors adhere to it in Bangladesh. Based on findings of non-compliance, it then investigates the reasons for such non-compliance through an appraisal of informed consent practices in Bangladesh and provides recommendations aimed at improving such practices. The significance of this paper lies in unveiling the interdependence between the ethical and legal traits of informed consent and their ramifications on strengthening the patient-oriented approach of duty to care.     

Bystanders and ethical review of research: Proceed with caution

Scientists seeking to conduct research with human subjects must first submit their proposals to research ethics committees (Institutional Review Boards [IRBs], in the United States). Some of these studies pose risks to “bystanders,” i.e., people who may be affected by the research but who are not enrolled as study subjects. Should IRBs expand their scope to include oversight over possible harms to bystanders as well as research subjects? This paper presents arguments against this step. Prior review of research with human subjects, despite its evident burden on the research enterprise, is a necessary caution, because the tension between the objectives of humane treatment of research subjects and sound scientific design and procedure has in the past led to serious abuses. This rationale is inapplicable in the case of bystanders. Moreover, in view of the many and varied effects of both research practices and scientific advances on the broader public over time, those who may be considered to be “bystanders” may potentially expand without limit; requiring IRBs to anticipate these distant and long-term effects as part of prior ethical review could greatly increase its burden and its deterrent effect on research. While conducting research without concern for serious potential harm to bystanders may be irresponsible and unethical, expanding the scope of prior review by IRBs to include risks to bystanders is not required by the principles governing human subjects research, and the costs and burdens of this expansion may outweigh any expected gains.     

Managing ethical challenges around misattributed parentage within the clinical context: Insights from an African moral theory

This study argues the thesis that a set of guidelines ‐ firmly rooted in a particular interpretation of African moral theory, specifically, Ubuntu – will do a better job than current medical ethics frameworks, in addressing ethical challenges around misattributed parentage within the clinical context. Incidental information such as information with significant personal/health implications raises unique challenges for medical professionals. For example, withholding information of misattributed paternity accidentally discovered in clinical interactions may be seen by a patient as a violation of his/her right‐to‐know. Contrarily, disclosure where a patient has not requested information – or where establishing paternity is not the purpose of clinical visit/interaction – may be taken by the patient as a violation of his/her right ‘not‐to‐know’. Resolving these challenges remain a herculean task. African moral theory contains an under‐emphasized value for addressing such ethical challenges around misattributed parentage in the field of transplant. I seek to contribute this knowledge; and enhance clinician‐patient relationship. This study builds off three completed systematic reviews, which aimed to answer the following questions: “what are the ethical challenges regarding information health professionals face within the clinical contest?” and “what core aspects (or common themes) of Ubuntu can be identified in existing literature describing the same?” In this present study, I applied the definition of Ubuntu which captures the core aspects of the theory in ethical literature on the same, to address ethical issues around unsought information of misattributed parentage in the field of transplant.     

Ethical Research Issues: Going Beyond the Declaration of Helsinki

La Vaque and Rossiter made a strong, supported argument that it is unethical to use a no treatment control group in a research study if a known, effective treatment is available. Their argument is based on the supposition that the Declaration of Helsinki is the ethical world standard for research with humans. Their argument appears to be straightforward, but is not simple to apply. The issues are very complex, include issues not discussed in their argument, and can lead to a different conclusion as pointed out in this paper. The World Medical Association developed the Declaration of Helsinki as one of their official policies. The Declaration of Helsinki, however, is not accepted as the world ethical standard, as demonstrated by its lack of adoption by many professional associations or even by the United States Federal Government. Perhaps it is not mentioned because its ethical provisions are aspirational rather than mandatory as implied by La Vaque and Rossiter. Researchers and clinicians should also be aware of other ethical issues not directly discussed in the La Vaque and Rossiter paper. The Belmont Report is the basis for the ethical protection of human research subjects for at least 17 federal agencies and does not mention the Declaration of Helsinki. The Belmont Report mentions several ethical principles that form the basis for informed consent, risk/benefit assessment, confidentiality of data, subject selection, Institutional Review Boards, and other protections needed when doing research with human subjects. At least 2 of these core principles have direct implications to the discussion related to the use of placebo controls. The ethical principle of fidelity is also important in guiding research activities with human subjects. Researchers should be familiar with the La Vaque and Rossiter argument, the Belmont Report, and the federal policies developed to implement the provisions of that report, for example, Regulation 45 CFR 46.