Food sharing: a model of manipulation by harassment

Most analyses of food-sharing behavior invoke complex explanationssuch as indirect and delayed benefits for sharing via kin selectionand reciprocal altruism. However, food sharing can be a moregeneral phenomenon accounted for by more parsimonious, mutualisticexplanations. We propose a game theoretical model of a generalsharing situation in which food owners share because it is in their own self-interest—they avoid high costs associatedwith beggar harassment. When beggars harass, owners may benefitfrom sharing part of the food if their consumption rate islow relative to the rate of cost accrual. Our model predictsthat harassment can be a profitable strategy for beggars if they reap some direct benefits from harassing other than sharedfood (such as picking up scraps). Therefore, beggars may manipulatethe owner's fitness payoffs in such a way as to make sharingmutualistic.     

The dynamical attainability of ESS in evolutionary games

In this paper, the attainability of ESS of the evolutionary game among n players under the frequency-independent selection is studied by means of a mathematical model describing the dynamical development and a concept of stability (strongly determined stability). It is assumed that natural selection and small mutations cause the phenotype to change gradually in the direction of fitness increasing. It is shown that (1) the ESS solution is not always evolutionarily attainable in the evolutionary dynamics, (2) in the game where the interaction between two species is completely competitive, the Nash solution is always attainable, and (3) one of two species may attain the state of minimum fitness as a result of evolution. The attainability of ESS is also examined in two game models on the sex ratio of wasps and aphids in light of our criterion of the attainability of ESS.     

Ka'apor ritual hunting

Several investigators cite population control, frequent settlement relocation, trekking, expansion of diet breadth, and food taboos as strategic responses to game depletion by indigenous populations living in interfluvial zones of lowland South America. The Ka'apor Indians of the interfluvial forest of northern Maranhão, Brazil, employ other means of optimizing hunting efficiency, partly based on ritual. Menstruating women, pubescent girls, and parents of newborns can consume meat only of the tortoise (Gochelone denticulata), the first prey species to be hunted out of an area. Tortoise capture requires, on average, one full day of hunting. This means that the full potential of hunting pressure does not materialize near the settlement. Meat productivity is unusually high even near old settlements. I argue that ritual tortoise hunting helps to regulate environmental utilization, to maintain a sustained yield of meat protein, and to expand the catchment area gradually.     

Kin selection and frequency dependence: a game theoretic approach

Game theory models show that the evolution of interactions between relatives is determined by two kinds of fitness effects: Hamilton's inclusive fitness effect, and a frequency-dependent synergistic effect. The latter arises when an individual's behaviour has different effects on the fitness of interactants, depending on whether or not they perform the same behaviour. Knowing the sign of the synergistic effect is sufficient to understand most of the qualitative features of genetic models that show departures from Hamilton's rule. Since this synergistic effect does not depend on the interactants being related, it is best viewed as something distinct from kin selection. In this view, Hamilton's rule is basically correct for describing kin selection, and most deviations from it are due to the distinct process of synergistic selection.     

The Hawk—Dove game revisited: Effects of continuous variation in resource-holding potential on the frequency of escalation

Summary The classic Hawk—Dove game is extended to deal with continuous variation in resource-holding potential or RHP, when RHP is observable (via any sensory modality) but RHP difference is less than perfectly reliable as a predictor of the outcome of an escalated contest. The relationship between sensory and physical magnitudes of RHP is assumed to be governed by Fechner's psychophysical law, whose effect is that contestants interact as if they had perfect information about their relative RHP (as opposed to RHP difference). Thus, an animal is aggressive if its RHP exceeds a certain fraction, called its threshold, of its opponent's RHP and otherwise is non-aggressive; and the classic Hawk and Dove strategies correspond to zero and infinite thresholds, respectively. For RHPs drawn at random from an arbitrary Gamma distribution there is a unique evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS, which depends on a parameter measuring the reliability of RHP as a predictor of the outcome of a fight, on the ratio of the valueV of winning to the costC of losing (both measured in units of reproductive fitness) and on the mean µ and variance ² of the RHP distribution. In a population at this ESS, ifV/C < 1 then the threshold is 1 and there is no fighting. AsV/C increases beyond 1 to a second critical value , however, the threshold decreases steadily from 1 to 0 and remains 0 forV/C > ; is an increasing function of , but a decreasing function of ². That a lower variance of RHP can imply a lower escalation frequencyp is a novel insight of the analysis. The prediction is at first counterintuitive, because if the aggression threshold were fixed then larger variance would imply lowerp (dispersion effect of variance). When natural selection acts on the threshold, however, increasing the variance not only reduces the probability that an animal with larger RHP will be attacked by an animal with lower RHP at the existing threshold, but also reduces the expected costs of adopting that particular threshold, so that a mutant with a somewhat lower threshold can invade the population (selection effect of variance). Forp, the selection effect dominates toward the upper end of the interval 1 V/C .     

Altruism,tit for tat and ‘outlaw’ genes

Summary In a prior study we combined game theory and inclusive fitness models to examine whether the guarded altruism that can evolve among non-relatives (tit for tat, TFT) might also evolve among close relatives, supplanting unconditional altruism. In most cases, TFT replaced unconditional altruism in family-structured models. Even when TFT is selected at a single locus, however, by withholding altruism from non-reciprocating relatives it may qualify as an outlaw from the standpoint of modifier genes at other loci. Here we examine this possibility with a series of haploid, two-locus models in which a modifier gene transforms TFT into unconditional altruism. The modifier allele spreads to fixation whenever Hamilton's Rule is satisfied, resulting in an unconditional altruist replacing the TFT strategy. As such, TFT may be regarded as an outlaw vulnerable to suppression by alleles at other loci.     

ORGANIZATION OF PREDATOR-PREY COMMUNITIES AS AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME

We consider a simple predator-prey model of coevolution. By allowing coevolution both within and between trophic levels the model breaks the traditional dichotomy between coevolution among competitors and coevolution between a prey and its predator. By allowing the diversity of prey and predator species to emerge as a property of the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), the model breaks another constraint of most approaches to coevolution that consider as fixed the number of coevolving species. The number of species comprising the ESS is influenced by a parameter that determines the predator's niche breadth. Depending upon the parameter's value the ESS may contain: 1) one prey and one predator species, 2) two prey and one predator, 3) two prey and two predators, 4) three prey and two predators, 5) three prey and three predators, etc. Evolutionarily, these different ESSs all emerge from the same model. Ecologically, however, these ESSs result in very different patterns of community organization. In some communities the predator species are ecologically keystone in that their removal results in extinctions among the prey species. In others, the removal of a predator species has no significant impact on the prey community. These varied ecological roles for the predator species contrasts sharply with the essential evolutionary role of the predators in promoting prey species diversity. The ghost of predation past in which a predator's insignificant ecological role obscures its essential evolutionary role may be a frequent property of communities of predator and prey.     

New food sources,conservation of biodiversity and sustainable development: can unconventional animal species contribute to feeding the world?

There is increasing interest in the potential of animal species that do not currently fall within the scope of conventional livestock farming to supplement the production of animal protein for human consumption. This paper provides an overview of the current situation and the conditions the led to it, and offers an analysis of the future of wildlife usage within the general framework of sustainable development.     

Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games

This note contains a generalization of the definition of an evolutionary stable strategy and of the corresponding game dynamics from 2-person to n-person games. This broader framework also allows modelling of several interacting populations or of populations containing different types of individuals, for example males and females.     

Chaos game representation of coding regions of human globin genes and alcohol dehydrogenase genes of phylogenetically divergent species

Summary Chaos game representation (CGR) is a novel holistic approach that provides a visual image of a DNA sequence quite different from the traditional linear arrangement of nucleotides. Although it is known that CGR patterns depict base composition and sequentiality, the biological significance of the specific features of each pattern is not understood. To systematically examine these features, we have examined the coding sequences of 7 human globin genes and 29 relatively conserved alcohol dehydrogenase (Adh) genes from phylogenetically divergent species. The CGRs of human globin cDNAs were similar to one another and to the entire human globin gene complex. Interestingly, human globin CGRs were also strikingly similar to human Adh CGRs. Adh CGRs were similar for genes of the same or closely related species but were different for relatively conserved Adh genes from distantly related species. Dinucleotide frequencies may account for the self-similar pattern that is characteristic of vertebrate CGRs and the genome-specific features of CGR patterns. Mutational frequencies of dinucleotides may vary among genome types. The special features of CG dinucleotides of vertebrates represent such an example. The CGR patterns examined thus far suggest that the evolution of a gene and its coding sequence should not be examined in isolation. Consideration should be given to genome-specific differential mutation rates for different dinucleotides or specific oligonucleotides. Offprint requests to: S. M. Singh