Comparative study of anthropometric measurements of the same subjects in two different institutes

The objectivity of several anthropometric measurements were tested in two institutes on the same subjects. In many cases systematic differences are to be expected: 1. Girth measurements tend to differences in the same direction. 2. The comparability of skeletal measurements is often uncertain; some measurements tend to give lower, other ones higher figures. Biacromial diameter and radio-ulnar epicondylar width do not reveal systematic differences. 3. Skinfold thicknesses measured do not reveal systematic differences.     

An alien approach to invasive species: objectivity and society in invasion biology

Several authors have recently argued that invasion biologists should adopt a more objective and dispassionate stance towards invasive species. Brown and Sax (Austral Ecol 29:530–536, 2004; Austral Ecol 30:481–483, 2005) assert that invasion biologists risk their objectivity, “commit the naturalist fallacy” or “embark on a slippery slope” with engaged concern about invasive species. Elsewhere, Colautti and MacIsaac (Divers Distrib 10:135–141, 2004) propose a neutral language for invasion biology, one that insulates scientific from popular discussion about invasive species. While there is certainly hyperbole about the effects of some invasive species, the type of objectivity promoted in these papers may often be inappropriate for invasion biology. It implies a policy of non-action that is inconsistent with the conservation values of many invasion biologists. To engage these values, invasion biologists can adopt deliberative methods for environmental problem-solving that involve stakeholders in their research design and which still promote high standards of scientific rigor.     

Debunking morality: evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory

The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false in virtue of being shown to be unjustified; truth having been defined epistemologically in terms of justification. By interpreting three recent error theoretical arguments in light of these strategies, the paper evaluates the epistemological and metaphysical relevance of empirical discoveries about morality as a naturally evolved phenomenon.