Explanation and prediction in vegetation science

A definition of vegetation science is given, spanning 6 levels of integration and stressing the interrelations among them. The problems of realism are discussed. The selection of levels is related to the adequate correspondence between conceptualization and research aims. Pattern and process are introduced as the central concepts of vegetation science. The perception of reality is dependent on the spatial and temporal scale chosen. The concept of noise is discussed in relation to stochasticity and randomness of events. Traces of essentialism are found both in classification of communities and habitat ecology. Classification is important, particularly the coexistence of alternative classification approaches. Organicism as a basis of vegetation research is rejected because the organismic view is inadequate on higher integration levels. The concept of function is redefined in a non-teleologic way.Present vegetation ecological research is inductivistic. One possible alternative to inductivism is falsificationism. The major domain of this approach is hypothesis testing, which will become more important. Progress can only be reached by a maximum degree of communication among scientific individuals.Predictive ecology is partly based on historic explanation, partly on complementary approaches. Characters of vegetation worthwhile to be predicted are listed and the necessary requirements for vegetation science to become predictive are discussed. A major requirement is the development of succession and life-history theory. A further elaboration of the individualistic concept will be a main task of vegetation science in the near future.     

How to be a chaste species pluralist-realist: the origins of species modes and the synapomorphic species concept

The biological species (biospecies) concept applies only to sexually reproducing species, which means that until sexual reproduction evolved, there were no biospecies. On the universal tree of life, biospecies concepts therefore apply only to a relatively small number of clades, notably plants andanimals. I argue that it is useful to treat the various ways of being a species (species modes) as traits of clades. By extension from biospecies to the other concepts intended to capture the natural realities of what keeps taxa distinct, we can treat other modes as traits also, and so come to understand that theplurality of species concepts reflects the biological realities of monophyletic groups.We should expect that specialists in different organisms will tend to favour those concepts that best represent the intrinsic mechanisms that keep taxa distinct in their clades. I will address the question whether modes ofreproduction such as asexual and sexual reproduction are natural classes, given that they are paraphyletic in most clades.     

The Role of Intuitive Ontologies in Scientific Understanding – the Case of Human Evolution

Psychological evidence suggests that laypeople understand the world around them in terms of intuitive ontologies which describe broad categories of objects in the world, such as ‘person’, ‘artefact’ and ‘animal’. However, because intuitive ontologies are the result of natural selection, they only need to be adaptive; this does not guarantee that the knowledge they provide is a genuine reflection of causal mechanisms in the world. As a result, science has parted ways with intuitive ontologies. Nevertheless, since the brain is evolved to understand objects in the world according to these categories, we can expect that they continue to play a role in scientific understanding. Taking the case of human evolution, we explore relationships between intuitive ontological and scientific understanding. We show that intuitive ontologies not only shape intuitions on human evolution, but also guide the direction and topics of interest in its research programmes. Elucidating the relationships between intuitive ontologies and science may help us gain a clearer insight into scientific understanding.     

Psychological essentialism from first principles

Cognitive scientists have documented the existence of “essentialist” intuitions in humans: from a very early age, we assume that things have deep unobserved properties that make them what they are. I provide a sketch of an adaptationist explanation of psychological essentialism, arguing that these intuitions are the unsurprising output of adaptations for inductive inference. Variations on this insight have previously been used mostly as after-the-fact speculations, yet theories of adaptive function should ideally have a primary role in informing psychological research. Here I propose that viewing essentialist intuitions through an adaptationist lens has implications for some widespread assumptions about the phenomenon. Notably, researchers' focus on “higher-level” processes like categorization has led them to assume that essentialism is restricted to a few cognitive processes, but the ubiquity of inductive inference problems in cognition suggests otherwise. Additionally, because essentialist intuitions are the output of mechanisms solving related but distinct inference problems, it is unlikely that a single mechanistic theory can account for them all.     

Non-essentialist methods in pre-Darwinian taxonomy

The current widespread belief that taxonomic methods used before Darwin were essentialist is ill-founded. The essentialist method developed by followers of Plato and Aristotle required definitions to state properties that are always present. Polythetic groups do not obey that requirement, whatever may have been the ontological beliefs of the taxonomist recognizing such groups. Two distinct methods of forming higher taxa, by chaining and by examplar, were widely used in the period between Linnaeus and Darwin, and both generated polythetic groups. Philosopher William Whewell congratulated pre-Darwinian taxonomists for not adhering to the rigid ideal of definition used in the mathematical sciences. What he called the method of types is here called the method of exemplars because typology has been equated with essentialism, whereas the use of a type species as the reference point or prototype for a higher category was a practice inconsistent with essentialism. The story that the essentialism of philosophers dominated the development of systematics may prove to be a myth.     

Tree thinking cannot taken for granted: challenges for teaching phylogenetics

Tree thinking is an integral part of modern evolutionary biology, and a necessary precondition for phylogenetics and comparative analyses. Tree thinking has during the 20th century largely replaced group thinking, developmental thinking and anthropocentricism in biology. Unfortunately, however, this does not imply that tree thinking can be taken for granted. The findings reported here indicate that tree thinking is very much an acquired ability which needs extensive training. I tested a sample of undergraduate and graduate students of biology by means of questionnaires. Not a single student was able to correctly interpret a simple tree drawing. Several other findings demonstrate that tree thinking is virtually absent in students unless they are explicitly taught how to read evolutionary trees. Possible causes and implications of this mental bias are discussed. It seems that biological textbooks can be an important source of confusion for students. While group and developmental thinking have disappeared from most textual representations of evolution, they have survived in the evolutionary tree drawings of many textbooks. It is quite common for students to encounter anthropocentric trees and even trees containing stem groups and paraphyla. While these biases originate from the unconscious philosophical assumptions made by authors, the findings suggest that presenting unbiased evolutionary trees in biological publications is not merely a philosophical virtue but has also clear practical implications.

The failure of morphology to contribute to the modern synthesis

How much, if anything, morphology contributed to the modern synthesis is partly a matter of how one defines that term. In the strict sense, morphology is a purely formal discipline and had very little to contribute. Morphology may also be considered a kind of data, and when it becomes functional a better case can be made for its role in evolutionary studies. Be that as it may, the incorporation of morphology into the synthesis was a later development. The initial focus was at the populational level, including the problems of speciation, which makes sense because that was where the opportunities seemed to be. As the synthesis evolved and matured it expanded its horizons and incorporated a larger range of topics. Very little discussion of morphology occurs in the canonical writings of the so-called architects. At the time when the synthesis was supposedly complete, which was around 1950, the incorporation of morphology into it was just beginning.