Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception

In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to things as they are in the world via non-projective perception. These two conclusions taken together form the basis of Aristotelian metaphysical realism and a refutation of the neo-Kantian two-factor approach to perception.     

Mechanical properties of sea-urchin lantern muscles: a comparative investigation of intact muscle groups in Paracentrotus lividus (Lam.) and Stylocidaris affinis (Phil.) (Echinodermata, Echinoidea)

The jaw apparatus, or lantern, of sea-urchins contains five pairs of retractor and protractor muscles which are responsible for lantern displacement. Using intact retractor or protractor groups, the force-length relations of these muscles were compared in two taxonomically distant species, Paracentrotus lividus and Stylocidaris affinis. The total contractile forces generated by the muscles can be resolved into vertical and horizontal components. It was found that the vertical component of the retractors is maximal at a lantern position which is significantly lower (i.e. more protruded) in Paracentrotus than in Stylocidaris. Total forces generated by the retractors were in both species maximal at or above the lantern `resting positions'. In Paracentrotus alone, the total force-displacement curves tended to be bimodal. It is hypothesized that the retractors of Paracentrotus contain two populations of muscle fibres, one adapted for jaw opening and one for lantern retraction. No significant differences in the properties of the protractors of the two species could be identified. The lantern of Paracentrotus is more mobile than that of Stylocidaris and is able to exploit a wider range of food sources. This investigation has shown that the force-length relations of the lantern muscles match their differing working conditions. Accepted: 3 November 1997     

The Biosemiotic Turn

With the publication of this inaugural issue of the internationally peer-reviewed journal Biosemiotics, our still-developing young interdiscipline marks yet another milestone in its journey towards adulthood. For this occasion, the editors of Biosemiotics have asked me to provide for those readers who may be newcomers to our field a very brief overview of the history of biosemiotics, contextualizing it within and against the larger currents of philosophical and scientific thinking from which it has emerged. To explain the origins of this most twenty-first century endeavour effectively, however, will require tracing—at least to the level of a thumbnail sketch—how the ‘sign’ concept appeared, was lost, and now must be painstakingly rediscovered and refined in science. To relate this long history, this article will appear in Biosemiotics in three instalments, examining, respectively: (1) The History of the Sign Concept in Pre-Modernist Science, (2) The History of the Sign Concept in Modernist Science, and (3) The Biosemiotic Attempt to Develop a More Useful Sign Concept for Contemporary Science. In this instalment, we begin our introductory ‘stroll through the woods of sciences and signs’ by following the development of the sign concept within the context of scientific inquiry, in necessarily broad outline, from the beginnings of such inquiry in sixth century BCE, through its long development in the Middle Ages, and up unto the onset of modernity. For only within this larger historical context can our contemporary attempt to develop a naturalistic understanding of sign relations be understood.

Darwin's concept of final cause: neither new nor trivial

Darwin'suse of final cause accords with the Aristotelian idea of finalcauses as explanatory types – as opposed to mechanical causes, which arealways particulars. In Wright's consequence etiology, anadaptation is explained by particular events, namely, its past consequences;hence, that etiology is mechanistic at bottom. This justifies Ghiselin'scharge that such versions of teleology trivialize the subject, But a purelymechanistic explanation of an adaptation allows it to appear coincidental.Patterns of outcome, whether biological or thermodynamic, cannot be explainedbytracing causal chains, even were that possible. They are explicanda of aspecialkind. The form of their explanation, in statistical mechanics or by naturalselection, is not captured by statistical variants of the covering-law model orrelated models of explanation. In them as in classical teleology, types ofoutcome are cited to explain why there are outcomes of those types. But onlywhen types are explanatory by being selected for, as inexplanations of animal and human behavior as well as in Darwin's theory ofnatural selection, but not in statistical mechanics, is the explanationteleological. Darwin's theory is nontrivially teleological.     

Richard Owen, Morphology and Evolution

Richard Owen has been condemned by Darwinians as an anti-evolutionist and an essentialist. In recent years he has been the object of a revisionist analysis intended to uncover evolutionary elements in his scientific enterprise. In this paper I will examine Owen's evolutionary hypothesis and its connections with von Baer's idea of divergent development. To give appropriate importance to Owen's evolutionism is the first condition to develop an up-to-date understanding of his scientific enterprise, that is to disentagle Owen's contribution to the modernization of typology and morphology. I will argue that Owen's Platonic essentialism is rhetorical and incongruous. On the contrary, an interpretation of the archetype based on Aristotle's biological works makes possible a new conception of type, based on a homeostatic mechanism of stability. The renewal of morphology hinges on homological correspondences and a homeostatic process is also the origin of serial and special homology. I will argue that special homology shows an evolutionary orientation insofar as it is a typically inter-specific character while serial homology is determined through an elementary usage of the categories of developmental morphology. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Necessitarianism and teleology in Aristotle's biology

In Aristotle's biological works, there is an apparent conflict between passages which seem to insist that only hypothetical necessity (anagk ex hypotheses) operates in the sublunary world, and passages in which some biological phenomena are explained as simply (hapls) necessary. Parallel to this textual problem lies the claim that explanations in terms of simple necessity render teleological explanations (in some of which Aristotle puts hypothetical necessity to use) superfluous. I argue that the textual conflict is only apparent, and that Aristotle's notion of coincidental sameness allows him to avoid the superfluity problem.     

The Concept of Human Dignity in the Ethics of Genetic Research

Despite criticism that dignity is a vague and slippery concept, a number of international guidelines on bioethics have cautioned against research that is contrary to human dignity, with reference specifically to genetic technology. What is the connection between genetic research and human dignity? In this article, I investigate the concept of human dignity in its various historical forms, and examine its status as a moral concept. Unlike Kant's ideal concept of human dignity, the empirical or relational concept takes human dignity as something that is affected by one's circumstances and what others do. I argue that the dignity objection to some forms of genetic research rests on a view of human nature that gives humans a special status in nature – one that is threatened by the potential of genetic research to reduce individuals to their genetic endowment. I distinguish two main philosophical accounts of human nature. One of these, the Aristotelian view, is compatible with the use of genetic technology to help humans realize their inherent potential to a fuller extent.     

Applying Aristotle's Doctrine of Causation to Aboriginal and Biomedical Understandings of Diabetes

Aristotle's doctrine on causationidentifies four distinct types of cause: formal, efficient,material, and final. Science is said to have differentiateditself from philosophy by concentrating solely on efficientcauses. Nonetheless, when applied to narratives of causation,Aristotle's doctrine provides a useful heuristic to explore theissues such as Aboriginal and biomedical perceptions of causalfactors for non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (NIDDM) onManitoulin Island, Ontario. This paper also outlines twodivergent causal stories for NIDDM and the associated moralpositions regarding the righteous pursuit of health. Biomedical narratives emphasize the role of lifestyle factors,particularly the impact of obesity, in causation. In the case ofdiabetes, the moral course of action is pursued through lifestylechoices. In contrast, Aboriginal narratives emphasize the roleof genetics in causation. These narratives describe diabetes ascollectively affecting Aboriginal people – thus identifyingAboriginal people as different. Aboriginal frameworks for healthventure beyond the efficient cause of biomedicine and thus themoral pursuit of health within this framework involves returningto an initial state of health and purity through traditionalknowledge.     

Human biogeography: evidence of our place in nature

Focusing on human biogeography as a research endeavour may make sense to biogeographers, but in the academic world generally this particular scholarly niche has long been filled by other rival disciplines such as sociology, human ecology, geography, anthropology and archaeology. It may be true that having so many ways of looking at ourselves as a species is a good thing, but it can also be argued that this academic fragmentation of effort has often nurtured the commonplace view that we as a species are 'above' or 'not part of' what plain folks call the 'natural world'. Here I review the historical and basic intellectual ingredients of what might be (but often isn't) called human biogeography. I offer a case study drawn from my research work on the Sepik coast of Papua New Guinea. This research illustrates how adopting an explicitly biogeographical approach to human diversity can lead to unexpected insights into the character and history of human settlement in this part of the world. One benefit of having a field with this explicit orientation might be that the conservation of biodiversity would make more sense to more people.