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Gregory Katz 《Biosemiotics》2008,1(1):57-73
Progress in molecular biology has revealed profound relations between linguistic and genomic sciences, mainly through advances in bioinformatics. The structural symmetries between biochemical and verbal syntaxes raise the question of their origins: did they emerge independently, or did one arise from the other? Does the genetic code contain the traces of a protolanguage, a universal grammar whose gradual evolution and successive mutations progressively led to the polymorphism of natural languages? To explore this question, we review the isomorphism of the genetic code and verbal codes from lexical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic standpoints. We discuss the limits of these symmetries and their anthropomorphic connotations. We observe the gradual evolution of species and languages according to parallel mechanisms, and the genetic roots of the physiology of language. In conclusion, we hypothesize that human observers may not be projecting linguistic frameworks onto genomic structures. Rather, it could be their linguistic faculties that reflect the grammatical structure of genetic code. 相似文献
2.
This article is a discussion of the critical remarks raised by Kristian Bankov in a notion called Bankov’s razor, about some
foundational elements of the biosemiotic paradigm. The elaborated form of the “razor” includes three main questions on biosemiotic
ideas, namely: 1) the philosophical grounds of the biosemiotic discourse, 2) the scientific output of biosemiotics, and 3)
the ethical consequences of some biosemiotic presumptions (this latter, given its scopes and extension, is left for a future
occasion). Such questions are commented and challenged by Dario Martinelli, from a point of view that is primarily that of
the zoosemiotician, therefore an insider of biosemiotics. In order to set the readers’ expectations in the right direction,
it shall perhaps be fair to inform them that the style of the article is rather sui generis, and can hardly be classified
within the genre of academic essays. Tones and terminology are more reminiscent of a philosophical pamphlet written in dialogical
form. Hopefully, this choice will not compromise the scientific content of the article.
相似文献
Kristian BankovEmail: |
3.
Kristin Andrews 《Biology & philosophy》2009,24(1):51-63
Following recent arguments that there is no logical problem with attributing mental or agential states to animals, I address
the epistemological problem of how to go about making accurate attributions. I suggest that there is a two-part general method
for determining whether a psychological property can be accurately attributed to a member of another species: folk expert
opinion and functionality. This method is based on well-known assessments used to attribute mental states to humans who are
unable to self-ascribe due to an early stage of development or impairment, and can be used to describe social and emotional
development as well as personality. I describe how instruments such as the Child Behavior Checklist, which relies on intersubjective
expert opinion, could be modified to assess other species subjects. The measures are validated via the accuracy of the predictions
that are derived, which is an example of the functionality of attribution. I respond to theoretical criticisms against use
of this method, and argue that if the method counts as good science for infant cognition research, then it should count as
good science for animal cognition research as well. Correspondingly, if the method doesn’t count as good science for animal
cognition research, then we must be very skeptical of its use with nonverbal humans.
相似文献
Kristin AndrewsEmail: |
4.
Brian L. Keeley 《Biology & philosophy》2004,19(4):521-540
The charge that anthropomorphizing nonhuman animals is a fallacy is itself largely misguided and mythic. Anthropomorphism in the study of animal behavior is placed in its original, theological context. Having set the historical stage, I then discuss its relationship to a number of other, related issues: the role of anecdotal evidence, the taxonomy of related anthropomorphic claims, its relationship to the attribution of psychological states in general, and the nature of the charge of anthropomorphism as a categorical claim. I then argue that the categorical reading of anthropomorphism cannot work and that it misrepresents what is being claimed when one claims that traits are shared between humans and nonhumans. We should think of such claims not as anthropomorphic per se– because that implies the trait is intrinsically human and only derivatively nonhuman. Instead, traits shared with mammals are mammalomorphic, for example, or primatomorphic when shared by primates. 相似文献
5.
Marc Bekoff 《Biology & philosophy》2004,19(4):489-520
In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice’ and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal?’ we can discover rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a ‘dogocentrist’ and practice ‘dogomorphism.’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big’ questions: Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust? Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair’ mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual's reproductive fitness, are more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for individuals to be able to behave fairly, to empathize, to behave morally? Can we use information about moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? I conclude that there is strong selection for cooperative fair play in which individuals establish and maintain a social contract to play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may be also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved. I also claim that the ability to make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely to do in a given social situation is a useful litmus test for explaining what might be happening in an individual's brain during social encounters, and that intentional or representational explanations are often important for making these predictions. 相似文献
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