Welfare of Apes in Captive Environments: Comments On,and By,a Specific Group of Apes

Accurately determining the proper captive environment for apes requires adequately assessing the psychological similarities between apes and humans. Scientists currently believe apes lack mental complexity (Millikan, 2006 Millikan, R. G. 2006. “Styles of rationality”. In Rational animals?, Edited by: Hurley, S. and Nudds, M. 117–126. Oxford, , England: Oxford University Press.. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), raising questions concerning the evolution of human culture from ape-like societies (Tomasello, 1999 Tomasello, M. 1999. The cultural origins of human cognition, Cambridge, , MA: Harvard University Press..  [Google Scholar]). A long-term cultural study with bonobos suggests less intellectual divergence from humans than currently postulated (Savage-Rumbaugh, 2005 Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. 2005. “Individual differences in language competencies in apes resulting from unique rearing conditions imposed by different first epistemologies”. In Symbol use and symbolic representation, Edited by: Namy, L. L. 199–219. Mahwah, , NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc..  [Google Scholar]). Because humans view apes as mentally limited, some current captive environments may appear idyllic while offering only an illusion of appropriate care, derived from a simplistic view of what apes are, rather than what they might be. This perception of apes determines their handling, which determines their mental development, which perpetuates the prevailing perception. Only breaking this cycle will allow the current perception of apes to change. Their usual captive environment limits any demonstration of culture. However, the bonobo study reveals what ape culture can become, which should affect future welfare considerations for at least those species genetically close to humans (bonobos and chimpanzees). Development of a languaged bonobo culture allows these nonhuman animals to provide their own responses regarding adequate ape welfare.     

Bonobo (Pan paniscus) Spatial Memory and Communication in a 20-hectare Forest

We used an artificial language as a tool for the study of spatial memory organization in a young Pan paniscus. In the first experiment, we showed the bonobo a road sign just outside its indoor sleeping area. The sign indicated, by means of arbitrarily designated geometrical shapes (lexigrams), where food was hidden. Only 2 of the 15 locations were visible from the sign. Distances ranged up to 170 m from the sign. In 99 of 127 test trials the bonobo went directly to the designated location on its first move. In a second experiment, we presented the road sign at varied points in the woods rather than at the original fixed place. In these trials the goal was a preferred toy. The bonobo's human companions were never told the location of the goal and distances were up to 650 m. In all 12 trials the bonobo led its companions to the designated place via an efficient path. The bonobo appeared to be able to move, based on the information provided by a lexigram, from almost any arbitrary starting location in its 20-ha environment to any one of the numerous goal locations.     

Ape Consciousness-Human Consciousness: A Perspective Informed by Language and Culture

Animal consciousness has long been assumed to be a nonviablearena of investigation. At best, it was thought that any indicationsof such consciousness, should it exist, would not be interpretableby our species. Recent work in the field of language competencieswith bonobos has laid this conception open to serious challenge.This paper reviews this work and the case it makes for our impendingcapacity to tap the consciousness of a uniquely enculturatedgroup of bonobos who are capable of comprehending human speechand employing a lexical communication system.     

The capacity of animals to acquire language: do species differences have anything to say to us?

Following the Gardners' discovery that an ape named Washoe could learn to produce and combine a number of hand movements similar to those used by deaf human beings, a variety of 'ape-language projects' sprang up. Some projects used different symbol systems, others used different training techniques, and others used different species of apes. While debate still rages regarding the appropriate way to interpret the symbolic productions of apes, three species of great apes (gorilla, orangutan, and chimpanzee) have now been credited with this capacity while no lesser apes or monkeys have been reported, at present, to have acquired such communicative skills. Among all of the claims made for the various animal species, the philosophers have entered the fray attempting to define the essence of what it is about language that makes it 'human'. This paper will compare and contrast the above positions to arrive at behavioural definitions of symbolic usage that can be applied across species. It will then present new data on a fourth ape species Pan paniscus which is proving to be the first non-human species to acquire symbolic skills in a spontaneous manner.