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1.
There are two broad functional explanations for second-party punishment: fitness-leveling and deterrence. The former suggests that people punish to reduce fitness differences, while the latter suggests that people punish in order to reciprocate losses and deter others from inflicting losses on them in the future. We explore the relative roles of these motivations using a pre-registered, two-player experiment with 2426 US participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants played as the “responder” and were assigned to either a Take or Augment condition. In the Take condition, the “partner” could steal money from the responder's bonus or do nothing. In the Augment condition, the partner could augment the responder's bonus by giving them money at no cost to themselves or do nothing. We also manipulated the responders' starting endowments, such that after the partner's decision, responders experienced different payoff outcomes: advantageous inequity, equality, or varying degrees of disadvantageous inequity. Responders then decided whether to pay a cost to punish the partner. Punishment was clearly influenced by theft and was most frequent when theft resulted in disadvantageous inequity. However, people also punished in the absence of theft, particularly when confronted with disadvantageous inequity. While the effect of inequity on punishment was small, our results suggest that punishment is motivated by more than just the desire to reciprocate losses. These findings highlight the multiple motivations undergirding punishment and bear directly on functional explanations for the existence of punishment in human societies.  相似文献   
2.
The biocontrol properties of Trichoderma species are well documented, but their effectiveness in antagonism of the problematic Sclerotium cepivorum, the causal agent of white rot in Allium species, appears limited with reports of significant control only relating to deliberately-mutated strains of Trichoderma. Our previous studies have indicated the possibility of using selected naturally-occurring strains of the antagonist in the suppression of other diseases; now in vitro and controlled environment in vivo studies have indicated that a degree of control of Onion White Rot is possible, and that the selected antagonist strains can be used in integrated treatments with Iprodione to good effect. The possible value of such treatments is considered in light of other approaches to the suppression of this continuing problem.  相似文献   
3.
Summary : FT is a tool written in C++, which implements the Fourier analysis method to locate periodicities in aminoacid or DNA sequences. It is provided for free public use on a WWW server with a Java interface. Availability : The server address is http://o2.db. uoa.gr/FT Contact : shamodr@atlas.uoa.gr   相似文献   
4.
Pairs of unrelated individuals face a prisoner's dilemma if cooperation is the best mutual outcome, but each player does best to defect regardless of his partner's behaviour. Although mutual defection is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in one-shot games, cooperative solutions based on reciprocity can emerge in iterated games. Among the most prominent theoretical solutions are the so-called bookkeeping strategies, such as tit-for-tat, where individuals copy their partner's behaviour in the previous round. However, the lack of empirical data conforming to predicted strategies has prompted the suggestion that the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is neither a useful nor realistic basis for investigating cooperation. Here, we discuss several recent studies where authors have used the IPD framework to interpret their data. We evaluate the validity of their approach and highlight the diversity of proposed solutions. Strategies based on precise accounting are relatively uncommon, perhaps because the full set of assumptions of the IPD model are rarely satisfied. Instead, animals use a diverse array of strategies that apparently promote cooperation, despite the temptation to cheat. These include both positive and negative reciprocity, as well as long-term mutual investments based on 'friendships'. Although there are various gaps in these studies that remain to be filled, we argue that in most cases, individuals could theoretically benefit from cheating and that cooperation cannot therefore be explained with the concept of positive pseudo-reciprocity. We suggest that by incorporating empirical data into the theoretical framework, we may gain fundamental new insights into the evolution of mutual reciprocal investment in nature.  相似文献   
5.
Humans use punishment to promote cooperation in laboratory experiments but evidence that punishment plays a similar role in non-human animals is comparatively rare. In this article, we examine why this may be the case by reviewing evidence from both laboratory experiments on humans and ecologically relevant studies on non-human animals. Generally, punishment appears to be most probable if players differ in strength or strategic options. Although these conditions are common in nature, punishment (unlike other forms of aggression) involves immediate payoff reductions to both punisher and target, with net benefits to punishers contingent on cheats behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. In many cases, aggression yielding immediate benefits may suffice to deter cheats and might explain the relative scarcity of punishment in nature.  相似文献   
6.
Joint group membership is of major importance for cooperation in humans, and close ties or familiarity with a partner are also thought to promote cooperation in other animals. Here, we present the opposite pattern: female cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, behave more cooperatively (by feeding more against their preference) when paired with an unfamiliar male rather than with their social partner. We propose that cooperation based on asymmetric punishment causes this reversed pattern. Males are larger than and dominant to female partners and are more aggressive to unfamiliar than to familiar female partners. In response, females behave more cooperatively with unfamiliar male partners. Our data suggest that in asymmetric interactions, weaker players might behave more cooperatively with out-group members than with in-group members to avoid harsher punishment.  相似文献   
7.
Punishment is an important deterrent against cheating in cooperative interactions. In humans, the severity of cheating affects the strength of punishment which, in turn, affects the punished individual's future behaviour. Here, we show such flexible adjustments for the first time in a non-human species, the cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus), where males are known to punish female partners. We exposed pairs of cleaners to a model client offering two types of food, preferred 'prawn' items and less-preferred 'flake' items. Analogous to interactions with real clients, eating a preferred prawn item ('cheating') led to model client removal. We varied the extent to which female cheating caused pay-off reduction to the male and measured the corresponding severity of male punishment. Males punished females more severely when females cheated during interactions with high value, rather than low value, model clients; and when females were similar in size to the male. This pattern may arise because, in this protogynous hermaphrodite, cheating by similar-sized females may reduce size differences to the extent that females change sex and become reproductive competitors. In response to more severe punishment from males, females behaved more cooperatively. Our results show that punishment can be adjusted to circumstances and that such subtleties can have an important bearing on the outcome of cooperative interactions.  相似文献   
8.
Sex biases in adult aggression have been well studied and commonly arise when resources which affect survival or lifetime reproductive success are less abundant or more valuable for individuals of one sex. Despite the prevalence of sex biases in adult aggression, evidence for sex biases in juvenile aggression is scant. Here, we present evidence for female‐biased juvenile aggression in cooperatively breeding pied babblers (Turdoides bicolor). Unlike most cases of non‐lethal sibling aggression, juvenile aggression in pied babblers does not seem to be determined by food availability. Instead, we found that juvenile aggression was related to adult dispersal patterns. This study shows that females that were more aggressive as juveniles attempted dispersal earlier than less aggressive females. Potential explanations for the association between juvenile aggression and adult dispersal patterns are discussed.  相似文献   
9.
The decision rules underpinning human cooperative behaviour are often investigated under laboratory conditions using monetary incentives. A major concern with this approach is that stake size may bias subjects’ decisions. This concern is particularly acute in online studies, where stakes are often far lower than those used in laboratory or field settings. We address this concern by conducting a Dictator Game using Amazon Mechanical Turk. In this two-player game, one player (the dictator) determines the division of an endowment between himself and the other player. We recruited subjects from India and the USA to play an online Dictator Game. Dictators received endowments of $1, $5 or $10. We collected two batches of data over two consecutive years. We found that players from India were less generous when playing with a $10 stake. By contrast, the effect of stake size among players from the USA was very small. This study indicates that the effects of stake size on decision making in economic games may vary across populations.  相似文献   
10.
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