Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly signaling model of apology

The present study examined a costly signaling model of human apology. The model assumes that an unintentional transgressor is more motivated to restore the relationship with the victim than an intentional transgressor who depreciates the relationship. The model predicts the existence of a separating equilibrium, in which only sincere apologizers will pay a certain cost to restore the relationship, while dishonest apologizers will not. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the receivers of an apology would be sensitive to the cost involved in the apology. 2 Experiment 1, 3 Experiment 2 were vignette experiments, in which participants imagined that they were victims of an interpersonal transgression and received either a costly or no-cost apology. The costliness of the apology was manipulated by the presence of an apology gift in Experiment 1, and by inconvenience voluntarily experienced by the transgressor to make an apology in Experiment 2. In both experiments, participants found the costly apologizer to be more sincere than the no-cost apologizer. Experiment 3 employed a modified dictator game, in which a fictitious partner behaved in an unfair manner and apologized to the participants. The apology cost was manipulated as a fee for sending the apology message. The results of 2 Experiment 1, 3 Experiment 2 were replicated. In addition, when given a chance to send a complaint message to the unfair person, participants in the costly apology condition abstained from doing so. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to applications of the costly signaling theory to interpersonal behavior.     

Dishonesty invites costly third-party punishment

Third-party punishment for norm violators is an evolvable enforcer of social norms. The present study, involving two experiments, examined whether violations of honesty norms would induce costly third-party punishments. In both experiments, participants in the third-party role observed a protocol of the trust game, in which the trustee solicited the trustor to transfer his/her endowment by stating that the trustee would return x units from the total resource. Dishonesty was defined such that the trustee in fact returned fewer than x units. Participants were asked about their willingness to incur some cost to reduce the trustee's payoff. In Experiment 1, x was exactly half of the total resource. Participants were willing to incur more cost to punish the dishonest trustee than the trustee who allocated the resource unequally but had not sent the dishonest message. In Experiment 2, x was more than half of the total resource and the dishonest trustee allocated the total resource equally. Therefore, the dishonest trustee was not unfair in Experiment 2. Approximately half of the participants (16 of 30) punished the dishonest but fair trustee, while few participants (1 of 30) punished the fair trustee who had not sent the dishonest message. These experiments together demonstrated that participants were willing to incur some cost to punish honesty-norm violators, even when the participants themselves were not harmed by the norm violation.     

Parasitological,Hematological and Biochemical Characteristics of a Model of Hyper-microfilariaemic Loiasis (Loa loa) in the Baboon (Papio anubis)

Background

Loiasis, a filarial infection caused by Loa loa usually thought to cause relatively minor morbidity, can cause serious and often fatal reactions in patients carrying very high levels of circulating Loa loa microfilariae (mf) following administration of microfilaricidal drugs. An experimental model of this condition would greatly aid the definition of the optimal management of this important clinical presentation.

Methodology/Principle Findings

Fifteen baboons (Papio anubis) were infected with 600 infective larvae (L3) isolated from Chrysops vector flies. Animals were observed for any clinical changes; blood samples were collected every 1–2 months for 22 months, and analysed for parasitological, hematological and biochemical profiles using standard techniques. All animals became patent but remained clinically normal throughout the study. The parasitological pre-patent period was between 4–8 months, with a majority (60%) of animals becoming patent by 5 months post infection (MPI); all animals were patent by 8 MPI. Microfilarial loads increased steadily in all animals and reached a peak at 18 MPI. By 10 MPI >70% of animals had mf >8,000 mf/mL, and at 18 MPI >70% of animals had mf >30,000mf/mL with 50% of these animals with mf >50,000mf/mL. Absolute eosinophil, creatinine, Ca²⁺ and K⁺ levels were generally above normal values (NV). Positive associations were seen between microfilariaemia and eosinophilia, Hb, Ca²⁺, and gamma-GT values, whilst significant negative associations were seen between microfilariaemia and potassium, glucose and mononuclear leukocyte levels.

Conclusions

Infection of splenectomised baboons with L. loa can induce levels of circulating microfilariae, and corresponding haematological profiles, which parallel those seen in those humans in danger of the severe post-microfilariacide clinical responses. Utilization of this experimental model could contribute to the improved management of the loiasis related adverse responses in humans.