Explanatory pluralism in evolutionary biology

The ontological dependence of one domain on another is compatible with the explanatory autonomy of the less basic domain. That autonomy results from the fact that the relationship between two domains can be very complex. In this paper I distinguish two different types of complexity, two ways the relationship between domains can fail to be transparent, both of which are relevant to evolutionary biology. Sometimes high level explanations preserve a certain type of causal or counterfactual information which would be lost at the lower level; I argue that this is central to the proper understanding of the adaptationist program. Sometimes high level kinds are multiply realised by lower level kinds: I argue that this is central to the understanding of macroevolution.     

The proximate/ultimate distinction in the multiple careers of Ernst Mayr

Ernst Mayr's distinction between “ultimate” and “proximate” causes is justly considered a major contribution to philosophy of biology. But how did Mayr come to this “philosophical” distinction, and what role did it play in his earlier “scientific” work? I address these issues by dividing Mayr's work into three careers or phases: 1) Mayr the naturalist/researcher, 2) Mayr the representative of and spokesman for evolutionary biology and systematics, and more recently 3) Mayr the historian and philosopher of biology. If we want to understand the role of the proximate/ultimate distinction in Mayr's more recent career as a philosopher and historian, then it helps to consider hisearlier use of the distinction, in the course of his research, and in his promotion of the professions of evolutionary biology and systematics. I believe that this approach would also shed light on some other important “philosophical” positions that Mayr has defended, including the distinction between “essentialism: and “population thinking.”     

The what,how and why of doing macroecology

Macroecology is a growing and important subdiscipline of ecology, but it is becoming increasingly diffuse, without an organizing principle that is widely agreed upon. I highlight two main current views of macroecology: as the study of large‐scale systems and as the study of emergent systems. I trace the history of both these views through the writings of the founders of macroecology. I also highlight the transmutation principle that identifies serious limitations to the study of large‐scale systems with reductionist approaches. And I suggest that much of the underlying goal of macroecology is the pursuit of general principles and the escape from contingency. I highlight that there are many intertwined aspects of macroecology, with a number of resulting implications. I propose that returning to a focus on studying assemblages of a large number of particles is a helpful view. I propose defining macroecology as “the study at the aggregate level of aggregate ecological entities made up of large numbers of particles for the purposes of pursuing generality”.     

Mind Architecture and Brain Architecture

The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture –, which is in general reductionist, but which retains the computer metaphor. This paper examines, in the first place, the concepts of mind architecture and brain architecture, in order to evaluate the syntheses which have recently been offered. It then moves on to show how modifications which have been made to classical functionalist mind architectures, with the aim of making them compatible with brain architectures, are unable to resolve some of the most serious problems of functionalism. Some suggestions are given as to why it is not possible to relate mind structures and brain structures by using neurocomputational approaches, and finally the question is raised of the validity of reductionism in a theory which sets out to unite mind and brain architectures.     

生态系统生态学研究的关键问题及趋势——从“整体论与还原论的争论”看

在生态学领域中,存在着生态系统整体论与还原论的争论。Tansley A.G.提出,生态系统是"准有机体"。Odum兄弟提出的"生态系统能量说"被广泛接受,但也受到质疑,称其为"还原论者的整体论"。基于对上述质疑的回应以及对生态系统整体论的追求,Patten B.C.等提出"生态网络理论",运用"网络‘环境子’分析"方法,试图从物理层面分析解决生物层面的"涌现性"问题。不过,这一理论也受到批判,认为其在探究符号化的现象对生态系统的动态影响时,陷入了还原论困境。Jrgensen S.E.等更进一步,提出"系统论"的生态系统生态学,试图从系统科学的角度研究生态系统的"物质-能量-信息-网络"系统。这一理论受到生态学界高度重视,但是也存在着在具体研究过程中如何平衡能量视角和生物地球化学视角的问题。由上述争论可见,生态系统生态学研究的趋势是从"物质实体"到"能量流动",再到"网络信息",最后到"开放系统"层层递进。目前面临的关键问题是:如何在更好地定义生态系统整体性的基础上,采取相应的能够体现生态系统整体性的方法,去获得更多、更好的生态系统整体性的认识。     

Between beanbag genetics and natural selection

The encounter between the Darwinian theory of evolution and Mendelism could be resolved only when reductionist tools could be applied to the analysis of complex systems. The instrumental reductionist interpretation of the hereditary basis of continuously varying traits provided mathematical tools which eventually allowed the construction of the Modern Synthesis of the theory of evolution.When genotypic as well as environmental variance allow the isolation of parts of the system, it is possible to apply Mendelian reductionism, that is , to treat the phenotypic trait as if ti causally determined by discrete genes for the trait. howeverm such a beanbag genetics approach obscures the system's eye-view. The concept of heritability, defined as the proportion of the total phenotypic variance due to (additive) hereditary variation, asserts that genetic elements have discrete effects; but by relating to the genotypic variance, it avoids the trap of reffering to genes for characters.     

Making the case for human life extension: personal arguments

In the close to medium future, the life sciences might permit a vast extension of the human life span. I will argue that this is a very desirable development for the individual person. The question whether death is a harm to the dying is irrelevant here. All it takes is that being alive is good for the living person and not being alive is not good for anyone. Thus, living persons who expect to live on happily are rationally required to want to stay alive. Eventual uncertainty whether it will be possible to be happy in the future provides no objection, but rather an incentive to try. This view, however, may be naive in assuming that persons are unchanging entities that exist separately from their psychological information. Objections have been derived from reductionistic views that value our future experiences in a way that declines with time, so that there will be a future point beyond which only negligible value accrues. If we adopt such a view, then we cannot now be concerned to have experiences beyond that point. I argue that these arguments fail to take into account all the reasons we might have to be concerned for the future and all kinds of such concern that come from them. The adoption of a plausible reductionistic account can arguably weaken our concern for the future and certainly change its quality in important ways. But this provides no objection to the desire to live forever, nor to live at all.