Power and corruption

Cooperation is ubiquitous in the natural world. What seems nonsensical is why natural selection favors a behavior whereby individuals would lose out by benefiting their competitor. This conundrum, for almost half a century, has puzzled scientists and remains a fundamental problem in biology, psychology, and economics. In recent years, the explanation that punishment can maintain cooperation has received much attention. Individuals who punish noncooperators thrive when punishment does not entail a cost to the punisher. However when punishment is costly, cooperation cannot be preserved. Most literature on punishment fails to consider that punishers may act corruptly by not cooperating when punishing noncooperators. No research has considered that there might be power asymmetries between punishers and nonpunishers that turn one of these type of individuals more or less susceptible to experiencing punishment. Here, we formulate a general game allowing corruption and power asymmetries between punishers and nonpunishers. We show that cooperation can persist if punishers possess power and use it to act corruptly. This result provides a new interpretation of recent data on corrupt policing in social insects and the psychology of power and hypocrisy in humans. These results suggest that corruption may play an important role in maintaining cooperation in insects and human societies. In contrast with previous research, we contend that costly punishment can be beneficial for social groups. This work allows us to identify ways in which corruption can be used to the advantage of a society.     

Conceptualising ‘fossiliferous deposit’ against ‘palaeontological deposit’: some semantic (and epistemological) considerations

This short essay intends to provide insight into the concepts of ‘fossiliferous deposit’ and ‘palaeontological deposit’ by identifying some of their semantic differences. From the moment that fossiliferous deposits are technically accessible to the palaeontologist, they are ‘palaeontological’ ones, but not before. However, not all palaeontological deposits must inevitably be ‘fossiliferous’ deposits in the sense of containing mineralised remains of the anatomical parts of organisms. As a consequence of the existence of fossiliferous deposits, the science of palaeontology exists, with the result that fossiliferous deposits become ‘palaeontological deposits’, together with the non-fossiliferous strata that are able to provide data on the ecological and/or ethological conditions of fossil beings from remains that are not ‘fossils’. From the point of view of philosophy of science, fossiliferous and palaeontological deposits should be considered as two different epistemological (as well as ontological) categories. Consequently, by identifying semantic differences, the concepts of ‘fossiliferous deposit’ and ‘palaeontological deposit’ can be framed better within the philosophical development of the palaeontological sciences. In addition to the central issue addressed in this essay, a brief discussion on the epistemic value of the dichotomy ‘to deposit’ versus ‘to reposit’ applied to palaeontological museology is brought up.     

Rawlsian Justice and Palliative Care

Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in Daniels' account, namely that care should be provided to restore people's opportunities. Daniels' view is both unable to provide pain relief to those who need it as a supplement to treatment and, without justice‐based reasons to provide palliative care to those whose opportunities cannot be restored. We conclude that this makes Daniels' framework much less attractive.     

A dark business,full of shadows: Analogy and theology in William Harvey

In a short work called De conceptione appended to the end of his Exercitationes de generatione animalium (1651), William Harvey developed a rather strange analogy. To explain how such marvelous productions as living beings were generated from the rather inauspicious ingredients of animal reproduction, Harvey argued that conception in the womb was like conception in the brain. It was mostly rejected at the time; it now seems a ludicrous theory based upon homonymy. However, this analogy offers insight into the structure and function of analogies in early modern natural philosophy. In this essay I hope to not only describe the complex nature of Harvey’s analogy, but also offer a novel interpretation of his use of analogical reasoning, substantially revising the account offered by Guido Giglioni (1993). I discuss two points of conceptual change and negotiation in connection with Harvey’s analogy, understanding it as both a confrontation between the border of the natural and the supernatural, as well as a moment in the history of psychology. My interpretation touches upon a number of important aspects, including why the analogy was rejected, how Harvey systematically deployed analogies according to his notions of natural philosophical method, how the analogy fits into contemporary discussions of analogies in science, and finally, how the analogy must be seen in the context of changing Renaissance notions of the science of the soul, ultimately confronting the problem of how to understand final causality in Aristotelian science. In connection with the last, I conclude the essay by turning to how Harvey embeds the analogy within a natural theological cosmology.     

The Philosophical Dullness of Classical Ecology, and a Levinsian Alternative

Ecology has had a lower profile in Biology & Philosophy than one might expect on the basis of the attention ecology is given in public discussions in relation to environmental issues. Our tentative explanation is that ecology appears theoretically redundant within biology and, consequently, philosophically challenging problemsrelated to biology are commonly supposed to be somewhere else, particularly in the molecular sphere. Richard Levins has recognized the genuine challenges posed by ecology for theoretical and philosophical thinking in biology. This essay sets the stage for appreciating his work; it was preceded by four articles published in Biology & Philosophy 15(2),and is followed by a personal reminiscent.     

Philosophy of science, policy sciences and the basis of decision support with LCA Based on the toxicity controversy in Sweden and the Netherlands

Current LCA implicitly assumes that a single rational truth can be found. Mainstream policy sciences has taken a different starting point when analysing decision making in complex and controversial societal debates for already several decades. In such debates, in general, more than one reasonable conceptualisation or ‘framing’ of the problem is at stake which forms the core of the controversy. This paper analyses the Dutch chlorine debate and the Swedish PVC debate and shows that (three) frames also play a role in toxicity controversies: the risk assessment frame, the strict control frame, and the precautionary frame. The latter frame, adhered to by the environmentalists, seeks to judge substances mainly on their inherent safety. The cases show that this logic may be defended as at least being equally reasonable to the emission-effect calculations that form the core of Risk Assessment and Life-cycle Impact Assessment (LCIA). As predicted by policy sciences, this finding implies that the political neutrality of tools like LCIA is questionable. In summary, the approaches and procedures developed for LCA have to be reconciled with key lessons from policy science and philosophy of science, i.e. considering the fact that multiple realities play a key role in many decision making processes. This paper suggests some alternative indicators for toxicity evaluations, and indicates the implications of LCA method development.     

Culture and Rights after Culture and Rights

Building on a critical, theoretical approach outlined in Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives (Cowan et al. 2001a), I posit rights processes as complex and contradictory: Both enabling and constraining, they produce new subjectivities and social relations and entail unintended consequences. To encourage interdisciplinary engagement on these themes, I explore selected texts that consider the relationship between culture and rights, addressing two literatures: (1) debates on culture, rights, and recognition in the context of multiculturalism among political philosophers and (2) an emerging literature by anthropologists, feminists, critical legal scholars, and engaged practitioners analyzing empirical cases. Although political philosophers elucidate ethical implications and clarify political projects, an outmoded arsenal of theoretical concepts of "culture,""society," and "the individual" has hampered their debates. When accounts are both theoretically informed and empirically grounded, contradictions, ambiguities, and impasses of culture and rights are more fully explored and the liberal model of rights and multiculturalism is more open to interrogation.     

Four thoughts on Charles Mills – Black rights/white wrongs: the critique of racial liberalism

In what follows I provide a review of Charles Mills’ text, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism. In four points I critique and build upon Mills’ contributions on (1) the multidimensional character of race, (2) the faith in liberalism to alleviate racial injustices, (3) the place of patriarchal tendencies in philosophy, and (4) the “white space” of sociology.     

Is infertility a disease and does it matter?

Claims about whether or not infertility is a disease are sometimes invoked to defend or criticize the provision of state‐funded treatment for infertility. In this paper, I suggest that this strategy is problematic. By exploring infertility through key approaches to disease in the philosophy of medicine, I show that there are deep theoretical disagreements regarding what subtypes of infertility qualify as diseases. Given that infertility’s disease status remains unclear, one cannot uncontroversially justify or undermine its claim to medical treatment by claiming that it is or is not a disease. Instead of focusing on disease status, a preferable strategy to approach the debate about state‐funded treatment is to explicitly address the specific ethical considerations raised by infertility. I show how this alternative strategy can be supported by a recent theoretical framework in the philosophy of medicine which avoids the problems associated with the concepts of health and disease.     

Beyond the Nature-Culture Dualism

It is commonly accepted that thewestern view of humanity's place in nature isdominated by a dualistic opposition between nature andculture. Historically this has arisen fromexternalization of nature in both productive andcognitive practices; instances of such externalizationhave become generalized. I think the dualism can bedecomposed by identifying dominant elements in eachparticular instantiation and showing that their strictseparation evaporates under close scrutiny. The philosophical challenge this perspective presents isto substitute concrete socioecological analysis forfoundational metaphysics. A review of majorinterpretations of the history of the dualism inWestern thought indicates that the legacy is moremultistranded than is usually admitted. Modern scienceis often assumed to lie squarely within the dualism,but this is unfounded. In contrast, science providestools for contextual analysis on how human activitiesand natural processes merge. The dualism thusevaporates in actual research practice. Nevertheless,the foundational metaphysics needs to be challenged,primarily because of its paralyzing effect onenvironmental philosophy.